robosats/api/logics.py

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from datetime import timedelta
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from django.utils import timezone
from api.lightning.node import LNNode
from django.db.models import Q
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from api.models import Order, LNPayment, MarketTick, User, Currency
from api.tasks import send_message
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from decouple import config
import math
import ast
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FEE = float(config("FEE"))
BOND_SIZE = float(config("BOND_SIZE"))
ESCROW_USERNAME = config("ESCROW_USERNAME")
PENALTY_TIMEOUT = int(config("PENALTY_TIMEOUT"))
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MIN_TRADE = int(config("MIN_TRADE"))
MAX_TRADE = int(config("MAX_TRADE"))
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EXP_MAKER_BOND_INVOICE = int(config("EXP_MAKER_BOND_INVOICE"))
EXP_TAKER_BOND_INVOICE = int(config("EXP_TAKER_BOND_INVOICE"))
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BOND_EXPIRY = int(config("BOND_EXPIRY"))
ESCROW_EXPIRY = int(config("ESCROW_EXPIRY"))
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PUBLIC_ORDER_DURATION = int(config("PUBLIC_ORDER_DURATION"))
INVOICE_AND_ESCROW_DURATION = int(config("INVOICE_AND_ESCROW_DURATION"))
FIAT_EXCHANGE_DURATION = int(config("FIAT_EXCHANGE_DURATION"))
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class Logics:
@classmethod
def validate_already_maker_or_taker(cls, user):
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"""Validates if a use is already not part of an active order"""
active_order_status = [
Order.Status.WFB,
Order.Status.PUB,
Order.Status.TAK,
Order.Status.WF2,
Order.Status.WFE,
Order.Status.WFI,
Order.Status.CHA,
Order.Status.FSE,
Order.Status.DIS,
Order.Status.WFR,
]
"""Checks if the user is already partipant of an active order"""
queryset = Order.objects.filter(maker=user,
status__in=active_order_status)
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if queryset.exists():
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return (
False,
{
"bad_request": "You are already maker of an active order"
},
queryset[0],
)
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queryset = Order.objects.filter(taker=user,
status__in=active_order_status)
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if queryset.exists():
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return (
False,
{
"bad_request": "You are already taker of an active order"
},
queryset[0],
)
# Edge case when the user is in an order that is failing payment and he is the buyer
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queryset = Order.objects.filter(Q(maker=user) | Q(taker=user),
status=Order.Status.FAI)
if queryset.exists():
order = queryset[0]
if cls.is_buyer(order, user):
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return (
False,
{
"bad_request":
"You are still pending a payment from a recent order"
},
order,
)
return True, None, None
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def validate_order_size(order):
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"""Validates if order is withing limits in satoshis at t0"""
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if order.t0_satoshis > MAX_TRADE:
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return False, {
"bad_request":
"Your order is too big. It is worth " +
"{:,}".format(order.t0_satoshis) +
" Sats now, but the limit is " + "{:,}".format(MAX_TRADE) +
" Sats"
}
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if order.t0_satoshis < MIN_TRADE:
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return False, {
"bad_request":
"Your order is too small. It is worth " +
"{:,}".format(order.t0_satoshis) +
" Sats now, but the limit is " + "{:,}".format(MIN_TRADE) +
" Sats"
}
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return True, None
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def user_activity_status(last_seen):
if last_seen > (timezone.now() - timedelta(minutes=2)):
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return "Active"
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elif last_seen > (timezone.now() - timedelta(minutes=10)):
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return "Seen recently"
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else:
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return "Inactive"
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@classmethod
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def take(cls, order, user):
is_penalized, time_out = cls.is_penalized(user)
if is_penalized:
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return False, {
"bad_request",
f"You need to wait {time_out} seconds to take an order",
}
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else:
order.taker = user
order.status = Order.Status.TAK
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order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.TAK])
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order.save()
send_message.delay(order.id,'order_taken')
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return True, None
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def is_buyer(order, user):
is_maker = order.maker == user
is_taker = order.taker == user
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return (is_maker and order.type == Order.Types.BUY) or (
is_taker and order.type == Order.Types.SELL)
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def is_seller(order, user):
is_maker = order.maker == user
is_taker = order.taker == user
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return (is_maker and order.type == Order.Types.SELL) or (
is_taker and order.type == Order.Types.BUY)
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def satoshis_now(order):
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"""checks trade amount in sats"""
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if order.is_explicit:
satoshis_now = order.satoshis
else:
exchange_rate = float(order.currency.exchange_rate)
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premium_rate = exchange_rate * (1 + float(order.premium) / 100)
satoshis_now = (float(order.amount) /
premium_rate) * 100 * 1000 * 1000
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return int(satoshis_now)
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def price_and_premium_now(order):
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"""computes order price and premium with current rates"""
exchange_rate = float(order.currency.exchange_rate)
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if not order.is_explicit:
premium = order.premium
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price = exchange_rate * (1 + float(premium) / 100)
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else:
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order_rate = float(
order.amount) / (float(order.satoshis) / 100000000)
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premium = order_rate / exchange_rate - 1
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premium = int(premium * 10000) / 100 # 2 decimals left
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price = order_rate
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significant_digits = 5
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price = round(
price,
significant_digits - int(math.floor(math.log10(abs(price)))) - 1)
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return price, premium
@classmethod
def order_expires(cls, order):
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"""General cases when time runs out."""
# Do not change order status if an order in any with
# any of these status is sent to expire here
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does_not_expire = [
Order.Status.DEL,
Order.Status.UCA,
Order.Status.EXP,
Order.Status.TLD,
Order.Status.DIS,
Order.Status.CCA,
Order.Status.PAY,
Order.Status.SUC,
Order.Status.FAI,
Order.Status.MLD,
]
if order.status in does_not_expire:
return False
elif order.status == Order.Status.WFB:
order.status = Order.Status.EXP
cls.cancel_bond(order.maker_bond)
order.save()
return True
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elif order.status == Order.Status.PUB:
cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond)
order.status = Order.Status.EXP
order.save()
send_message.delay(order.id,'order_expired_untaken')
return True
elif order.status == Order.Status.TAK:
cls.cancel_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.kick_taker(order)
send_message.delay(order.id,'taker_expired_b4bond')
return True
elif order.status == Order.Status.WF2:
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"""Weird case where an order expires and both participants
did not proceed with the contract. Likely the site was
down or there was a bug. Still bonds must be charged
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to avoid service DDOS."""
cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.cancel_escrow(order)
order.status = Order.Status.EXP
order.save()
return True
elif order.status == Order.Status.WFE:
maker_is_seller = cls.is_seller(order, order.maker)
# If maker is seller, settle the bond and order goes to expired
if maker_is_seller:
cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
# If seller is offline the escrow LNpayment does not exist
try:
cls.cancel_escrow(order)
except:
pass
order.status = Order.Status.EXP
order.save()
return True
# If maker is buyer, settle the taker's bond order goes back to public
else:
cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
# If seller is offline the escrow LNpayment does not even exist
try:
cls.cancel_escrow(order)
except:
pass
order.taker = None
order.taker_bond = None
order.trade_escrow = None
cls.publish_order(order)
return True
elif order.status == Order.Status.WFI:
# The trade could happen without a buyer invoice. However, this user
# is likely AFK; will probably desert the contract as well.
maker_is_buyer = cls.is_buyer(order, order.maker)
# If maker is buyer, settle the bond and order goes to expired
if maker_is_buyer:
cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.return_escrow(order)
order.status = Order.Status.EXP
order.save()
return True
# If maker is seller settle the taker's bond, order goes back to public
else:
cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.return_escrow(order)
order.taker = None
order.taker_bond = None
order.trade_escrow = None
cls.publish_order(order)
return True
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elif order.status in [Order.Status.CHA, Order.Status.FSE]:
# Another weird case. The time to confirm 'fiat sent or received' expired. Yet no dispute
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# was opened. Hint: a seller-scammer could persuade a buyer to not click "fiat
# sent", we assume this is a dispute case by default.
cls.open_dispute(order)
return True
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@classmethod
def kick_taker(cls, order):
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"""The taker did not lock the taker_bond. Now he has to go"""
# Add a time out to the taker
if order.taker:
profile = order.taker.profile
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profile.penalty_expiration = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=PENALTY_TIMEOUT)
profile.save()
# Make order public again
order.taker = None
order.taker_bond = None
cls.publish_order(order)
return True
@classmethod
def open_dispute(cls, order, user=None):
# Always settle escro and bonds during a dispute. Disputes
# can take long to resolve, it might trigger force closure
# for unresolve HTLCs) Dispute winner will have to submit a
# new invoice for value of escrow + bond.
if not order.trade_escrow.status == LNPayment.Status.SETLED:
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cls.settle_escrow(order)
cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
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order.is_disputed = True
order.status = Order.Status.DIS
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order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.DIS])
order.save()
# User could be None if a dispute is open automatically due to weird expiration.
if not user == None:
profile = user.profile
profile.num_disputes = profile.num_disputes + 1
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if profile.orders_disputes_started == None:
profile.orders_disputes_started = [str(order.id)]
else:
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profile.orders_disputes_started = list(
profile.orders_disputes_started).append(str(order.id))
profile.save()
return True, None
def dispute_statement(order, user, statement):
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"""Updates the dispute statements"""
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if not order.status == Order.Status.DIS:
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return False, {
"bad_request":
"Only orders in dispute accept dispute statements"
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}
if len(statement) > 5000:
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return False, {
"bad_statement": "The statement is longer than 5000 characters"
}
if len(statement) < 100:
return False, {
"bad_statement": "The statement is too short. Make sure to be thorough."
}
if order.maker == user:
order.maker_statement = statement
else:
order.taker_statement = statement
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# If both statements are in, move status to wait for dispute resolution
if order.maker_statement not in [None,""] or order.taker_statement not in [None,""]:
order.status = Order.Status.WFR
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order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.WFR])
order.save()
return True, None
@classmethod
def payout_amount(cls, order, user):
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"""Computes buyer invoice amount. Uses order.last_satoshis,
that is the final trade amount set at Taker Bond time"""
if cls.is_buyer(order, user):
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invoice_amount = int(order.last_satoshis *
(1 - FEE)) # Trading FEE is charged here.
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return True, {"invoice_amount": invoice_amount}
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@classmethod
def update_invoice(cls, order, user, invoice):
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# only the buyer can post a buyer invoice
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if not cls.is_buyer(order, user):
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return False, {
"bad_request":
"Only the buyer of this order can provide a buyer invoice."
}
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if not order.taker_bond:
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return False, {"bad_request": "Wait for your order to be taken."}
if (not (order.taker_bond.status == order.maker_bond.status ==
LNPayment.Status.LOCKED)
and not order.status == Order.Status.FAI):
return False, {
"bad_request":
"You cannot submit a invoice while bonds are not locked."
}
num_satoshis = cls.payout_amount(order, user)[1]["invoice_amount"]
payout = LNNode.validate_ln_invoice(invoice, num_satoshis)
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if not payout["valid"]:
return False, payout["context"]
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order.payout, _ = LNPayment.objects.update_or_create(
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concept=LNPayment.Concepts.PAYBUYER,
type=LNPayment.Types.NORM,
sender=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
order_paid=
order, # In case this user has other payouts, update the one related to this order.
receiver=user,
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# if there is a LNPayment matching these above, it updates that one with defaults below.
defaults={
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"invoice": invoice,
"status": LNPayment.Status.VALIDI,
"num_satoshis": num_satoshis,
"description": payout["description"],
"payment_hash": payout["payment_hash"],
"created_at": payout["created_at"],
"expires_at": payout["expires_at"],
},
)
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# If the order status is 'Waiting for invoice'. Move forward to 'chat'
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if order.status == Order.Status.WFI:
order.status = Order.Status.CHA
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order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.CHA])
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# If the order status is 'Waiting for both'. Move forward to 'waiting for escrow'
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if order.status == Order.Status.WF2:
# If the escrow does not exist, or is not locked move to WFE.
if order.trade_escrow == None:
order.status = Order.Status.WFE
# If the escrow is locked move to Chat.
elif order.trade_escrow.status == LNPayment.Status.LOCKED:
order.status = Order.Status.CHA
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order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.CHA])
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else:
order.status = Order.Status.WFE
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# If the order status is 'Failed Routing'. Retry payment.
if order.status == Order.Status.FAI:
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if LNNode.double_check_htlc_is_settled(
order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
order.status = Order.Status.PAY
order.payout.status = LNPayment.Status.FLIGHT
order.payout.routing_attempts = 0
order.payout.save()
order.save()
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order.save()
return True, None
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def add_profile_rating(profile, rating):
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"""adds a new rating to a user profile"""
# TODO Unsafe, does not update ratings, it adds more ratings everytime a new rating is clicked.
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profile.total_ratings += 1
latest_ratings = profile.latest_ratings
if latest_ratings == None:
profile.latest_ratings = [rating]
profile.avg_rating = rating
else:
latest_ratings = ast.literal_eval(latest_ratings)
latest_ratings.append(rating)
profile.latest_ratings = latest_ratings
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profile.avg_rating = sum(list(map(int, latest_ratings))) / len(
latest_ratings
) # Just an average, but it is a list of strings. Has to be converted to int.
profile.save()
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def is_penalized(user):
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"""Checks if a user that is not participant of orders
has a limit on taking or making a order"""
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if user.profile.penalty_expiration:
if user.profile.penalty_expiration > timezone.now():
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time_out = (user.profile.penalty_expiration -
timezone.now()).seconds
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return True, time_out
return False, None
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@classmethod
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def cancel_order(cls, order, user, state=None):
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# Do not change order status if an is in order
# any of these status
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do_not_cancel = [
Order.Status.DEL,
Order.Status.UCA,
Order.Status.EXP,
Order.Status.TLD,
Order.Status.DIS,
Order.Status.CCA,
Order.Status.PAY,
Order.Status.SUC,
Order.Status.FAI,
Order.Status.MLD,
]
if order.status in do_not_cancel:
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return False, {"bad_request": "You cannot cancel this order"}
# 1) When maker cancels before bond
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"""The order never shows up on the book and order
status becomes "cancelled" """
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if order.status == Order.Status.WFB and order.maker == user:
cls.cancel_bond(order.maker_bond)
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order.status = Order.Status.UCA
order.save()
return True, None
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# 2) When maker cancels after bond
"""The order dissapears from book and goes to cancelled. If strict, maker is charged the bond
to prevent DDOS on the LN node and order book. If not strict, maker is returned
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the bond (more user friendly)."""
elif order.status == Order.Status.PUB and order.maker == user:
# Return the maker bond (Maker gets returned the bond for cancelling public order)
if cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond): # strict cancellation: cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond):
order.status = Order.Status.UCA
order.save()
send_message.delay(order.id,'public_order_cancelled')
return True, None
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# 3) When taker cancels before bond
""" The order goes back to the book as public.
LNPayment "order.taker_bond" is deleted() """
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elif order.status == Order.Status.TAK and order.taker == user:
# adds a timeout penalty
cls.cancel_bond(order.taker_bond)
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cls.kick_taker(order)
send_message.delay(order.id,'taker_canceled_b4bond')
return True, None
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# 4) When taker or maker cancel after bond (before escrow)
"""The order goes into cancelled status if maker cancels.
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The order goes into the public book if taker cancels.
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In both cases there is a small fee."""
# 4.a) When maker cancel after bond (before escrow)
"""The order into cancelled status if maker cancels."""
elif (order.status in [
Order.Status.PUB, Order.Status.TAK, Order.Status.WF2,
Order.Status.WFE
] and order.maker == user):
# Settle the maker bond (Maker loses the bond for canceling an ongoing trade)
valid = cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
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cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond) # returns taker bond
if valid:
order.status = Order.Status.UCA
order.save()
return True, None
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# 4.b) When taker cancel after bond (before escrow)
"""The order into cancelled status if maker cancels."""
elif (order.status in [Order.Status.WF2, Order.Status.WFE]
and order.taker == user):
# Settle the maker bond (Maker loses the bond for canceling an ongoing trade)
valid = cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
if valid:
order.taker = None
cls.publish_order(order)
return True, None
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# 5) When trade collateral has been posted (after escrow)
"""Always goes to CCA status. Collaboration is needed.
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When a user asks for cancel, 'order.m/t/aker_asked_cancel' goes True.
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When the second user asks for cancel. Order is totally cancelled.
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Must have a small cost for both parties to prevent node DDOS."""
elif order.status in [
Order.Status.WFI, Order.Status.CHA
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]:
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# if the maker had asked, and now the taker does: cancel order, return everything
if order.maker_asked_cancel and user == order.taker:
cls.collaborative_cancel(order)
return True, None
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# if the taker had asked, and now the maker does: cancel order, return everything
elif order.taker_asked_cancel and user == order.maker:
cls.collaborative_cancel(order)
return True, None
# Otherwise just make true the asked for cancel flags
elif user == order.taker:
order.taker_asked_cancel = True
order.save()
return True, None
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elif user == order.maker:
order.maker_asked_cancel = True
order.save()
return True, None
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else:
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return False, {"bad_request": "You cannot cancel this order"}
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@classmethod
def collaborative_cancel(cls, order):
cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.return_escrow(order)
order.status = Order.Status.CCA
order.save()
return
def publish_order(order):
order.status = Order.Status.PUB
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order.expires_at = order.created_at + timedelta(
seconds=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.PUB])
order.save()
return
@classmethod
def is_maker_bond_locked(cls, order):
if order.maker_bond.status == LNPayment.Status.LOCKED:
return True
elif LNNode.validate_hold_invoice_locked(order.maker_bond):
cls.publish_order(order)
return True
return False
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@classmethod
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def gen_maker_hold_invoice(cls, order, user):
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# Do not gen and cancel if order is older than expiry time
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if order.expires_at < timezone.now():
cls.order_expires(order)
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return False, {
"bad_request":
"Invoice expired. You did not confirm publishing the order in time. Make a new order."
}
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# Return the previous invoice if there was one and is still unpaid
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if order.maker_bond:
if cls.is_maker_bond_locked(order):
return False, None
elif order.maker_bond.status == LNPayment.Status.INVGEN:
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return True, {
"bond_invoice": order.maker_bond.invoice,
"bond_satoshis": order.maker_bond.num_satoshis,
}
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# If there was no maker_bond object yet, generates one
order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order)
bond_satoshis = int(order.last_satoshis * BOND_SIZE)
description = f"RoboSats - Publishing '{str(order)}' - Maker bond - This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally."
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# Gen hold Invoice
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try:
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hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice(
bond_satoshis,
description,
invoice_expiry=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.WFB],
cltv_expiry_secs=BOND_EXPIRY * 3600,
)
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except Exception as e:
print(str(e))
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if "failed to connect to all addresses" in str(e):
return False, {
"bad_request":
"The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware."
}
if "wallet locked" in str(e):
return False, {
"bad_request":
"This is weird, RoboSats' lightning wallet is locked. Check in the Telegram group, maybe the staff has died."
}
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order.maker_bond = LNPayment.objects.create(
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concept=LNPayment.Concepts.MAKEBOND,
type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD,
sender=user,
receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
invoice=hold_payment["invoice"],
preimage=hold_payment["preimage"],
status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN,
num_satoshis=bond_satoshis,
description=description,
payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"],
created_at=hold_payment["created_at"],
expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"],
cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"],
)
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order.save()
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return True, {
"bond_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"],
"bond_satoshis": bond_satoshis,
}
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@classmethod
def finalize_contract(cls, order):
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"""When the taker locks the taker_bond
the contract is final"""
# THE TRADE AMOUNT IS FINAL WITH THE CONFIRMATION OF THE TAKER BOND!
# (This is the last update to "last_satoshis", it becomes the escrow amount next)
order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order)
order.taker_bond.status = LNPayment.Status.LOCKED
order.taker_bond.save()
# Both users profiles are added one more contract // Unsafe can add more than once.
order.maker.profile.total_contracts += 1
order.taker.profile.total_contracts += 1
order.maker.profile.save()
order.taker.profile.save()
# Log a market tick
MarketTick.log_a_tick(order)
# With the bond confirmation the order is extended 'public_order_duration' hours
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.WF2])
order.status = Order.Status.WF2
order.save()
return True
@classmethod
def is_taker_bond_locked(cls, order):
if order.taker_bond.status == LNPayment.Status.LOCKED:
return True
elif LNNode.validate_hold_invoice_locked(order.taker_bond):
cls.finalize_contract(order)
return True
return False
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@classmethod
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def gen_taker_hold_invoice(cls, order, user):
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# Do not gen and kick out the taker if order is older than expiry time
if order.expires_at < timezone.now():
cls.order_expires(order)
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return False, {
"bad_request":
"Invoice expired. You did not confirm taking the order in time."
}
# Do not gen if a taker invoice exist. Do not return if it is already locked. Return the old one if still waiting.
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if order.taker_bond:
if cls.is_taker_bond_locked(order):
return False, None
elif order.taker_bond.status == LNPayment.Status.INVGEN:
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return True, {
"bond_invoice": order.taker_bond.invoice,
"bond_satoshis": order.taker_bond.num_satoshis,
}
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# If there was no taker_bond object yet, generates one
order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order)
bond_satoshis = int(order.last_satoshis * BOND_SIZE)
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pos_text = "Buying" if cls.is_buyer(order, user) else "Selling"
description = (
f"RoboSats - Taking 'Order {order.id}' {pos_text} BTC for {str(float(order.amount)) + Currency.currency_dict[str(order.currency.currency)]}"
+
" - Taker bond - This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally."
)
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# Gen hold Invoice
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try:
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hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice(
bond_satoshis,
description,
invoice_expiry=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.TAK],
cltv_expiry_secs=BOND_EXPIRY * 3600,
)
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except Exception as e:
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if "status = StatusCode.UNAVAILABLE" in str(e):
return False, {
"bad_request":
"The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware."
}
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order.taker_bond = LNPayment.objects.create(
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concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TAKEBOND,
type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD,
sender=user,
receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
invoice=hold_payment["invoice"],
preimage=hold_payment["preimage"],
status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN,
num_satoshis=bond_satoshis,
description=description,
payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"],
created_at=hold_payment["created_at"],
expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"],
cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"],
)
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.TAK])
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order.save()
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return True, {
"bond_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"],
"bond_satoshis": bond_satoshis,
}
def trade_escrow_received(order):
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"""Moves the order forward"""
# If status is 'Waiting for both' move to Waiting for invoice
if order.status == Order.Status.WF2:
order.status = Order.Status.WFI
# If status is 'Waiting for invoice' move to Chat
elif order.status == Order.Status.WFE:
order.status = Order.Status.CHA
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order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.CHA])
order.save()
@classmethod
def is_trade_escrow_locked(cls, order):
if order.trade_escrow.status == LNPayment.Status.LOCKED:
return True
elif LNNode.validate_hold_invoice_locked(order.trade_escrow):
cls.trade_escrow_received(order)
return True
return False
@classmethod
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def gen_escrow_hold_invoice(cls, order, user):
# Do not generate if escrow deposit time has expired
if order.expires_at < timezone.now():
cls.order_expires(order)
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return False, {
"bad_request":
"Invoice expired. You did not send the escrow in time."
}
# Do not gen if an escrow invoice exist. Do not return if it is already locked. Return the old one if still waiting.
if order.trade_escrow:
# Check if status is INVGEN and still not expired
if cls.is_trade_escrow_locked(order):
return False, None
elif order.trade_escrow.status == LNPayment.Status.INVGEN:
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return True, {
"escrow_invoice": order.trade_escrow.invoice,
"escrow_satoshis": order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis,
}
# If there was no taker_bond object yet, generate one
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escrow_satoshis = (order.last_satoshis
) # Amount was fixed when taker bond was locked
description = f"RoboSats - Escrow amount for '{str(order)}' - It WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET. It will be released to the buyer once you confirm you received the fiat. It will automatically return if buyer does not confirm the payment."
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# Gen hold Invoice
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try:
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hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice(
escrow_satoshis,
description,
invoice_expiry=Order.t_to_expire[Order.Status.WF2],
cltv_expiry_secs=ESCROW_EXPIRY * 3600,
)
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except Exception as e:
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if "status = StatusCode.UNAVAILABLE" in str(e):
return False, {
"bad_request":
"The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware."
}
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order.trade_escrow = LNPayment.objects.create(
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concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TRESCROW,
type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD,
sender=user,
receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
invoice=hold_payment["invoice"],
preimage=hold_payment["preimage"],
status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN,
num_satoshis=escrow_satoshis,
description=description,
payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"],
created_at=hold_payment["created_at"],
expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"],
cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"],
)
order.save()
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return True, {
"escrow_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"],
"escrow_satoshis": escrow_satoshis,
}
def settle_escrow(order):
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"""Settles the trade escrow hold invoice"""
# TODO ERROR HANDLING
if LNNode.settle_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.preimage):
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
order.trade_escrow.save()
return True
def settle_bond(bond):
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"""Settles the bond hold invoice"""
# TODO ERROR HANDLING
if LNNode.settle_hold_invoice(bond.preimage):
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
bond.save()
return True
def return_escrow(order):
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"""returns the trade escrow"""
if LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.RETNED
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order.trade_escrow.save()
return True
def cancel_escrow(order):
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"""returns the trade escrow"""
# Same as return escrow, but used when the invoice was never LOCKED
if LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.CANCEL
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order.trade_escrow.save()
return True
def return_bond(bond):
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"""returns a bond"""
if bond == None:
return
try:
LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(bond.payment_hash)
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.RETNED
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bond.save()
return True
except Exception as e:
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if "invoice already settled" in str(e):
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
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bond.save()
return True
else:
raise e
def cancel_bond(bond):
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"""cancel a bond"""
# Same as return bond, but used when the invoice was never LOCKED
if bond == None:
return True
try:
LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(bond.payment_hash)
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.CANCEL
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bond.save()
return True
except Exception as e:
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if "invoice already settled" in str(e):
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
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bond.save()
return True
else:
raise e
@classmethod
def confirm_fiat(cls, order, user):
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"""If Order is in the CHAT states:
If user is buyer: fiat_sent goes to true.
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If User is seller and fiat_sent is true: settle the escrow and pay buyer invoice!"""
if (order.status == Order.Status.CHA
or order.status == Order.Status.FSE
): # TODO Alternatively, if all collateral is locked? test out
# If buyer, settle escrow and mark fiat sent
if cls.is_buyer(order, user):
order.status = Order.Status.FSE
order.is_fiat_sent = True
# If seller and fiat was sent, SETTLE ESCROW AND PAY BUYER INVOICE
elif cls.is_seller(order, user):
if not order.is_fiat_sent:
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return False, {
"bad_request":
"You cannot confirm to have received the fiat before it is confirmed to be sent by the buyer."
}
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# Make sure the trade escrow is at least as big as the buyer invoice
if order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis <= order.payout.num_satoshis:
return False, {
"bad_request":
"Woah, something broke badly. Report in the public channels, or open a Github Issue."
}
if cls.settle_escrow(
order
): ##### !!! KEY LINE - SETTLES THE TRADE ESCROW !!!
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
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# Double check the escrow is settled.
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if LNNode.double_check_htlc_is_settled(
order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
# RETURN THE BONDS // Probably best also do it even if payment failed
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond)
##### !!! KEY LINE - PAYS THE BUYER INVOICE !!!
##### Backgroun process "follow_invoices" will try to pay this invoice until success
order.status = Order.Status.PAY
order.payout.status = LNPayment.Status.FLIGHT
order.payout.save()
order.save()
send_message.delay(order.id,'trade_successful')
return True, None
else:
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return False, {
"bad_request":
"You cannot confirm the fiat payment at this stage"
}
order.save()
return True, None
@classmethod
def rate_counterparty(cls, order, user, rating):
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rating_allowed_status = [
Order.Status.PAY,
Order.Status.SUC,
Order.Status.FAI,
Order.Status.MLD,
Order.Status.TLD,
]
# If the trade is finished
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if order.status in rating_allowed_status:
# if maker, rates taker
if order.maker == user and order.maker_rated == False:
cls.add_profile_rating(order.taker.profile, rating)
order.maker_rated = True
order.save()
# if taker, rates maker
if order.taker == user and order.taker_rated == False:
cls.add_profile_rating(order.maker.profile, rating)
order.taker_rated = True
order.save()
else:
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return False, {
"bad_request": "You cannot rate your counterparty yet."
}
return True, None
@classmethod
def rate_platform(cls, user, rating):
user.profile.platform_rating = rating
user.profile.save()
return True, None