Deprecate unsigned invoices (#633)

* Fix connected chat status

* Delete option to submit unsigned address and invoices
This commit is contained in:
Reckless_Satoshi 2023-08-14 14:22:15 +00:00 committed by GitHub
parent ca3f7cb222
commit 9db89606cb
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
2 changed files with 19 additions and 35 deletions

View File

@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ class OrderViewSchema:
Update an order
`action` field is required and determines what is to be done. Below
is an explaination of what each action does:
is an explanation of what each action does:
- `take`
- If the order has not expired and is still public, on a
@ -220,13 +220,14 @@ class OrderViewSchema:
- `update_invoice`
- This action only is valid if you are the buyer. The `invoice`
field needs to be present in the body and the value must be a
valid LN invoice. Make sure to perform this action only when
valid LN invoice as cleartext PGP message signed with the robot key. Make sure to perform this action only when
both the bonds are locked. i.e The status of your order is
at least `6` (Waiting for trade collateral and buyer invoice)
- `update_address`
- This action is only valid if you are the buyer. This action is
used to set an on-chain payout address if you wish to have your
payout be recieved on-chain. This enables on-chain swap for the
payout be received on-chain. Only valid if there is an address in the body as
cleartext PGP message signed with the robot key. This enables on-chain swap for the
order, so even if you earlier had submitted a LN invoice, it
will be ignored. You get to choose the `mining_fee_rate` as
well. Mining fee rate is specified in sats/vbyte.
@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ class OrderViewSchema:
- `11` - In dispute
- `12` - Collaboratively cancelled
- `13` - Sending satoshis to buyer
- `14` - Sucessful trade
- `14` - Successful trade
- `15` - Failed lightning network routing
- `17` - Maker lost dispute
- `18` - Taker lost dispute
@ -246,13 +247,13 @@ class OrderViewSchema:
mid-trade so use this action carefully:
- As a maker if you cancel an order after you have locked your
maker bond, you are returend your bond. This may change in
maker bond, you are returned your bond. This may change in
the future to prevent DDoSing the LN node and you won't be
returend the maker bond.
returned the maker bond.
- As a taker there is a time penalty involved if you `take` an
order and cancel it without locking the taker bond.
- For both taker or maker, if you cancel the order when both
have locked thier bonds (status = `6` or `7`), you loose your
have locked their bonds (status = `6` or `7`), you loose your
bond and a percent of it goes as "rewards" to your
counterparty and some of it the platform keeps. This is to
discourage wasting time and DDoSing the platform.
@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ class InfoViewSchema:
class RewardViewSchema:
post = {
"summary": "Withdraw reward",
"description": "Withdraw user reward by submitting an invoice",
"description": "Withdraw user reward by submitting an invoice. The invoice must be send as cleartext PGP message signed with the robot key",
"responses": {
200: {
"type": "object",

View File

@ -534,11 +534,6 @@ class OrderView(viewsets.ViewSet):
# 2) If action is 'update invoice'
elif action == "update_invoice":
# DEPRECATE post v0.5.1.
if "---" not in pgp_invoice:
valid_signature = True
invoice = pgp_invoice
else:
# END DEPRECATE.
valid_signature, invoice = verify_signed_message(
request.user.robot.public_key, pgp_invoice
)
@ -557,12 +552,6 @@ class OrderView(viewsets.ViewSet):
# 2.b) If action is 'update address'
elif action == "update_address":
# DEPRECATE post v0.5.1.
if "---" not in pgp_address:
valid_signature = True
address = pgp_address
else:
# END DEPRECATE.
valid_signature, address = verify_signed_message(
request.user.robot.public_key, pgp_address
)
@ -815,12 +804,6 @@ class RewardView(CreateAPIView):
pgp_invoice = serializer.data.get("invoice")
# DEPRECATE post v0.5.1.
if "---" not in pgp_invoice:
valid_signature = True
invoice = pgp_invoice
else:
# END DEPRECATE.
valid_signature, invoice = verify_signed_message(
request.user.robot.public_key, pgp_invoice
)