import math
from datetime import timedelta
from decouple import config
from django.contrib.auth.models import User
from django.db.models import Q, Sum
from django.utils import timezone
from api.lightning.node import LNNode
from api.models import Currency, LNPayment, MarketTick, OnchainPayment, Order
from api.tasks import send_devfund_donation, send_notification
from api.utils import validate_onchain_address
from chat.models import Message
FEE = float(config("FEE"))
MAKER_FEE_SPLIT = float(config("MAKER_FEE_SPLIT"))
ESCROW_USERNAME = config("ESCROW_USERNAME")
PENALTY_TIMEOUT = int(config("PENALTY_TIMEOUT"))
MIN_ORDER_SIZE = config("MIN_ORDER_SIZE", cast=int, default=20_000)
MAX_ORDER_SIZE = config("MAX_ORDER_SIZE", cast=int, default=5_000_000)
EXP_MAKER_BOND_INVOICE = int(config("EXP_MAKER_BOND_INVOICE"))
EXP_TAKER_BOND_INVOICE = int(config("EXP_TAKER_BOND_INVOICE"))
BLOCK_TIME = float(config("BLOCK_TIME"))
MAX_MINING_NETWORK_SPEEDUP_EXPECTED = float(
config("MAX_MINING_NETWORK_SPEEDUP_EXPECTED")
)
class Logics:
@classmethod
def validate_already_maker_or_taker(cls, user):
"""Validates if a use is already not part of an active order"""
active_order_status = [
Order.Status.WFB,
Order.Status.PUB,
Order.Status.PAU,
Order.Status.TAK,
Order.Status.WF2,
Order.Status.WFE,
Order.Status.WFI,
Order.Status.CHA,
Order.Status.FSE,
Order.Status.DIS,
Order.Status.WFR,
]
"""Checks if the user is already partipant of an active order"""
queryset = Order.objects.filter(maker=user, status__in=active_order_status)
if queryset.exists():
return (
False,
{"bad_request": "You are already maker of an active order"},
queryset[0],
)
queryset = Order.objects.filter(taker=user, status__in=active_order_status)
if queryset.exists():
return (
False,
{"bad_request": "You are already taker of an active order"},
queryset[0],
)
# Edge case when the user is in an order that is failing payment and he is the buyer
queryset = Order.objects.filter(
Q(maker=user) | Q(taker=user),
status__in=[Order.Status.FAI, Order.Status.PAY],
)
if queryset.exists():
order = queryset[0]
if cls.is_buyer(order, user):
return (
False,
{
"bad_request": "You are still pending a payment from a recent order"
},
order,
)
return True, None, None
@classmethod
def validate_order_size(cls, order):
"""Validates if order size in Sats is within limits at t0"""
if not order.has_range:
if order.t0_satoshis > MAX_ORDER_SIZE:
return False, {
"bad_request": "Your order is too big. It is worth "
+ "{:,}".format(order.t0_satoshis)
+ " Sats now, but the limit is "
+ "{:,}".format(MAX_ORDER_SIZE)
+ " Sats"
}
if order.t0_satoshis < MIN_ORDER_SIZE:
return False, {
"bad_request": "Your order is too small. It is worth "
+ "{:,}".format(order.t0_satoshis)
+ " Sats now, but the limit is "
+ "{:,}".format(MIN_ORDER_SIZE)
+ " Sats"
}
elif order.has_range:
min_sats = cls.calc_sats(
order.min_amount, order.currency.exchange_rate, order.premium
)
max_sats = cls.calc_sats(
order.max_amount, order.currency.exchange_rate, order.premium
)
if min_sats > max_sats / 1.5:
return False, {
"bad_request": "Maximum range amount must be at least 50 percent higher than the minimum amount"
}
elif max_sats > MAX_ORDER_SIZE:
return False, {
"bad_request": "Your order maximum amount is too big. It is worth "
+ "{:,}".format(int(max_sats))
+ " Sats now, but the limit is "
+ "{:,}".format(MAX_ORDER_SIZE)
+ " Sats"
}
elif min_sats < MIN_ORDER_SIZE:
return False, {
"bad_request": "Your order minimum amount is too small. It is worth "
+ "{:,}".format(int(min_sats))
+ " Sats now, but the limit is "
+ "{:,}".format(MIN_ORDER_SIZE)
+ " Sats"
}
elif min_sats < max_sats / 15:
return False, {
"bad_request": "Your order amount range is too large. Max amount can only be 15 times bigger than min amount"
}
return True, None
def validate_amount_within_range(order, amount):
if amount > float(order.max_amount) or amount < float(order.min_amount):
return False, {
"bad_request": "The amount specified is outside the range specified by the maker"
}
return True, None
def user_activity_status(last_seen):
if last_seen > (timezone.now() - timedelta(minutes=2)):
return "Active"
elif last_seen > (timezone.now() - timedelta(minutes=10)):
return "Seen recently"
else:
return "Inactive"
@classmethod
def take(cls, order, user, amount=None):
is_penalized, time_out = cls.is_penalized(user)
if is_penalized:
return False, {
"bad_request",
f"You need to wait {time_out} seconds to take an order",
}
else:
if order.has_range:
order.amount = amount
order.taker = user
order.update_status(Order.Status.TAK)
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK)
)
order.save(update_fields=["amount", "taker", "expires_at"])
order.log(
f"Taken by Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) for {order.amount} fiat units"
)
return True, None
def is_buyer(order, user):
is_maker = order.maker == user
is_taker = order.taker == user
return (is_maker and order.type == Order.Types.BUY) or (
is_taker and order.type == Order.Types.SELL
)
def is_seller(order, user):
is_maker = order.maker == user
is_taker = order.taker == user
return (is_maker and order.type == Order.Types.SELL) or (
is_taker and order.type == Order.Types.BUY
)
def calc_sats(amount, exchange_rate, premium):
exchange_rate = float(exchange_rate)
premium_rate = exchange_rate * (1 + float(premium) / 100)
return (float(amount) / premium_rate) * 100 * 1000 * 1000
@classmethod
def satoshis_now(cls, order):
"""checks trade amount in sats"""
if order.is_explicit:
satoshis_now = order.satoshis
else:
amount = order.amount if order.amount is not None else order.max_amount
satoshis_now = cls.calc_sats(
amount, order.currency.exchange_rate, order.premium
)
return int(satoshis_now)
def price_and_premium_now(order):
"""computes order price and premium with current rates"""
exchange_rate = float(order.currency.exchange_rate)
if not order.is_explicit:
premium = order.premium
price = exchange_rate * (1 + float(premium) / 100)
else:
amount = order.amount if not order.has_range else order.max_amount
order_rate = float(amount) / (float(order.satoshis) / 100_000_000)
premium = order_rate / exchange_rate - 1
premium = int(premium * 10_000) / 100 # 2 decimals left
price = order_rate
significant_digits = 5
price = round(
price, significant_digits - int(math.floor(math.log10(abs(price)))) - 1
)
return price, premium
@classmethod
def order_expires(cls, order):
"""General cases when time runs out."""
# Do not change order status if an order in any with
# any of these status is sent to expire here
does_not_expire = [
Order.Status.UCA,
Order.Status.EXP,
Order.Status.TLD,
Order.Status.DIS,
Order.Status.CCA,
Order.Status.PAY,
Order.Status.SUC,
Order.Status.FAI,
Order.Status.MLD,
]
# in any case, if order is_swap and there is an onchain_payment, cancel it.
if order.status not in does_not_expire:
cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order)
if order.status in does_not_expire:
return False
elif order.status == Order.Status.WFB:
order.update_status(Order.Status.EXP)
order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NMBOND
cls.cancel_bond(order.maker_bond)
order.save(update_fields=["expiry_reason"])
order.log("Order expired while waiting for maker bond")
order.log("Maker bond was cancelled")
return True
elif order.status in [Order.Status.PUB, Order.Status.PAU]:
cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond)
order.update_status(Order.Status.EXP)
order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NTAKEN
order.save(update_fields=["expiry_reason"])
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_expired_untaken")
order.log("Order expired while public or paused")
order.log("Maker bond was unlocked")
return True
elif order.status == Order.Status.TAK:
cls.cancel_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.kick_taker(order)
order.log("Order expired while waiting for taker bond")
order.log("Taker bond was cancelled")
return True
elif order.status == Order.Status.WF2:
"""Weird case where an order expires and both participants
did not proceed with the contract. Likely the site was
down or there was a bug. Still bonds must be charged
to avoid service DDOS."""
cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.cancel_escrow(order)
order.update_status(Order.Status.EXP)
order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NESINV
order.save(update_fields=["expiry_reason"])
order.log(
"Order expired while waiting for both buyer invoice and seller escrow"
)
order.log("Maker bond was settled")
order.log("Taker bond was settled")
return True
elif order.status == Order.Status.WFE:
maker_is_seller = cls.is_seller(order, order.maker)
# If maker is seller, settle the bond and order goes to expired
if maker_is_seller:
cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
# If seller is offline the escrow LNpayment does not exist
try:
cls.cancel_escrow(order)
except Exception:
pass
order.update_status(Order.Status.EXP)
order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NESCRO
order.save(update_fields=["expiry_reason"])
# Reward taker with part of the maker bond
cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond)
order.log("Order expired while waiting for escrow of the maker/seller")
order.log("Maker bond was settled")
order.log("Taker bond was unlocked")
return True
# If maker is buyer, settle the taker's bond order goes back to public
else:
cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
# If seller is offline the escrow LNpayment does not even exist
try:
cls.cancel_escrow(order)
except Exception:
pass
taker_bond = order.taker_bond
cls.publish_order(order)
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_published")
# Reward maker with part of the taker bond
cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, taker_bond, order.maker_bond)
order.log("Order expired while waiting for escrow of the taker/seller")
order.log("Taker bond was settled")
return True
elif order.status == Order.Status.WFI:
# The trade could happen without a buyer invoice. However, this user
# is likely AFK; will probably desert the contract as well.
maker_is_buyer = cls.is_buyer(order, order.maker)
# If maker is buyer, settle the bond and order goes to expired
if maker_is_buyer:
cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.return_escrow(order)
order.update_status(Order.Status.EXP)
order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NINVOI
order.save(update_fields=["expiry_reason"])
# Reward taker with part of the maker bond
cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond)
order.log("Order expired while waiting for invoice of the maker/buyer")
order.log("Maker bond was settled")
order.log("Taker bond was unlocked")
return True
# If maker is seller settle the taker's bond, order goes back to public
else:
cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.return_escrow(order)
taker_bond = order.taker_bond
cls.publish_order(order)
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_published")
# Reward maker with part of the taker bond
cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, taker_bond, order.maker_bond)
order.log("Order expired while waiting for invoice of the taker/buyer")
order.log("Taker bond was settled")
return True
elif order.status in [Order.Status.CHA, Order.Status.FSE]:
# Another weird case. The time to confirm 'fiat sent or received' expired. Yet no dispute
# was opened. Hint: a seller-scammer could persuade a buyer to not click "fiat
# sent", we assume this is a dispute case by default.
cls.open_dispute(order)
order.log(
"Order expired during chat and a dispute was opened automatically"
)
return True
@classmethod
def kick_taker(cls, order):
"""The taker did not lock the taker_bond. Now he has to go"""
# Add a time out to the taker
if order.taker:
robot = order.taker.robot
robot.penalty_expiration = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=PENALTY_TIMEOUT
)
robot.save(update_fields=["penalty_expiration"])
# Make order public again
cls.publish_order(order)
order.log("Taker was kicked out of the order")
return True
@classmethod
def automatic_dispute_resolution(cls, order):
"""Simple case where a dispute can be solved with a
priori knowledge. For example, a dispute that opens
at expiration on an order where one of the participants
never sent a message on the chat and never marked 'fiat
sent'. By solving the dispute automatically before
flagging it as dispute, we avoid having to settle the
bonds"""
# If fiat has been marked as sent, automatic dispute
# resolution is not possible.
if order.is_fiat_sent and not order.reverted_fiat_sent:
return False
# If the order has not entered dispute due to time expire
# (a user triggered it), automatic dispute resolution is
# not possible.
if order.expires_at >= timezone.now():
return False
num_messages_taker = len(
Message.objects.filter(order=order, sender=order.taker)
)
num_messages_maker = len(
Message.objects.filter(order=order, sender=order.maker)
)
if num_messages_maker == num_messages_taker == 0:
cls.return_escrow(order)
cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
order.update_status(Order.Status.DIS)
order.log("Maker bond was settled")
order.log("Taker bond was settled")
order.log(
"No robot wrote in the chat, the dispute cannot be solved automatically"
)
elif num_messages_maker == 0:
cls.return_escrow(order)
cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
order.update_status(Order.Status.MLD)
cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond)
order.log("Maker bond was settled")
order.log("Taker bond was unlocked")
order.log(
"The dispute was solved automatically: 'Maker lost dispute', the maker did not write in the chat"
)
elif num_messages_taker == 0:
cls.return_escrow(order)
cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond)
order.update_status(Order.Status.TLD)
cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.taker_bond, order.maker_bond)
order.log("Maker bond was unlocked")
order.log("Taker bond was settled")
order.log(
"The dispute was solved automatically: 'Taker lost dispute', the maker did not write in the chat"
)
else:
return False
order.is_disputed = True
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.DIS)
)
order.save(update_fields=["is_disputed", "expires_at"])
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="dispute_opened")
return True
@classmethod
def open_dispute(cls, order, user=None):
# Always settle escrow and bonds during a dispute. Disputes
# can take long to resolve, it might trigger force closure
# for unresolved HTLCs) Dispute winner will have to submit a
# new invoice for value of escrow + bond.
valid_status_open_dispute = [
Order.Status.CHA,
Order.Status.FSE,
]
if order.status not in valid_status_open_dispute:
return False, {
"bad_request": "You cannot open a dispute of this order at this stage"
}
automatically_solved = cls.automatic_dispute_resolution(order)
if automatically_solved:
return True, None
if not order.trade_escrow.status == LNPayment.Status.SETLED:
cls.settle_escrow(order)
cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
order.is_disputed = True
order.update_status(Order.Status.DIS)
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.DIS)
)
order.save(update_fields=["is_disputed", "expires_at"])
# User could be None if a dispute is open automatically due to time expiration.
if user is not None:
robot = user.robot
robot.num_disputes = robot.num_disputes + 1
if robot.orders_disputes_started is None:
robot.orders_disputes_started = [str(order.id)]
else:
robot.orders_disputes_started = list(
robot.orders_disputes_started
).append(str(order.id))
robot.save(update_fields=["num_disputes", "orders_disputes_started"])
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="dispute_opened")
order.log(
f"Dispute was opened {f'by Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username})' if user else ''}"
)
order.log("Maker bond was settled")
order.log("Taker bond was settled")
return True, None
def dispute_statement(order, user, statement):
"""Updates the dispute statements"""
if not order.status == Order.Status.DIS:
return False, {
"bad_request": "Only orders in dispute accept dispute statements"
}
if len(statement) > 50_000:
return False, {
"bad_statement": "The statement and chat logs are longer than 50,000 characters"
}
if len(statement) < 100:
return False, {
"bad_statement": "The statement is too short. Make sure to be thorough."
}
if order.maker == user:
order.maker_statement = statement
order.save(update_fields=["maker_statement"])
else:
order.taker_statement = statement
order.save(update_fields=["taker_statement"])
# If both statements are in, move status to wait for dispute resolution
if order.maker_statement not in [None, ""] and order.taker_statement not in [
None,
"",
]:
order.update_status(Order.Status.WFR)
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WFR)
)
order.save(update_fields=["status", "expires_at"])
order.log(
f"Dispute statement submitted by Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) with length of {len(statement)} chars"
)
return True, None
def compute_swap_fee_rate(balance):
shape = str(config("SWAP_FEE_SHAPE"))
if shape == "linear":
MIN_SWAP_FEE = config("MIN_SWAP_FEE", cast=float, default=0.01)
MIN_POINT = float(config("MIN_POINT"))
MAX_SWAP_FEE = float(config("MAX_SWAP_FEE"))
MAX_POINT = float(config("MAX_POINT"))
if float(balance.onchain_fraction) > MIN_POINT:
swap_fee_rate = MIN_SWAP_FEE
else:
slope = (MAX_SWAP_FEE - MIN_SWAP_FEE) / (MAX_POINT - MIN_POINT)
swap_fee_rate = (
slope * (balance.onchain_fraction - MAX_POINT) + MAX_SWAP_FEE
)
elif shape == "exponential":
MIN_SWAP_FEE = config("MIN_SWAP_FEE", cast=float, default=0.01)
MAX_SWAP_FEE = float(config("MAX_SWAP_FEE"))
SWAP_LAMBDA = float(config("SWAP_LAMBDA"))
swap_fee_rate = MIN_SWAP_FEE + (MAX_SWAP_FEE - MIN_SWAP_FEE) * math.exp(
-SWAP_LAMBDA * float(balance.onchain_fraction)
)
return swap_fee_rate * 100
@classmethod
def create_onchain_payment(cls, order, user, preliminary_amount):
"""
Creates an empty OnchainPayment for order.payout_tx.
It sets the fees to be applied to this order if onchain Swap is used.
If the user submits a LN invoice instead. The returned OnchainPayment goes unused.
"""
# Make sure no invoice payout is attached to order
order.payout = None
# Create onchain_payment
onchain_payment = OnchainPayment.objects.create(receiver=user)
# Compute a safer available onchain liquidity: (confirmed_utxos - reserve - pending_outgoing_txs))
# Accounts for already committed outgoing TX for previous users.
confirmed = onchain_payment.balance.onchain_confirmed
# We assume a reserve of 300K Sats (3 times higher than LND's default anchor reserve)
reserve = 300_000
pending_txs = OnchainPayment.objects.filter(
status__in=[OnchainPayment.Status.VALID, OnchainPayment.Status.QUEUE]
).aggregate(Sum("num_satoshis"))["num_satoshis__sum"]
if pending_txs is None:
pending_txs = 0
available_onchain = confirmed - reserve - pending_txs
if (
preliminary_amount > available_onchain
): # Not enough onchain balance to commit for this swap.
return False
suggested_mining_fee_rate = LNNode.estimate_fee(
amount_sats=preliminary_amount,
target_conf=config("SUGGESTED_TARGET_CONF", cast=int, default=2),
)["mining_fee_rate"]
# Hardcap mining fee suggested at 1000 sats/vbyte
if suggested_mining_fee_rate > 1000:
suggested_mining_fee_rate = 1000
onchain_payment.suggested_mining_fee_rate = max(2.05, suggested_mining_fee_rate)
onchain_payment.swap_fee_rate = cls.compute_swap_fee_rate(
onchain_payment.balance
)
onchain_payment.save()
order.payout_tx = onchain_payment
order.save(update_fields=["payout_tx"])
order.log(
f"Empty OnchainPayment({order.payout_tx.id},{order.payout_tx}) was created. Available onchain balance is {available_onchain} Sats"
)
return True
@classmethod
def payout_amount(cls, order, user):
"""Computes buyer invoice amount. Uses order.last_satoshis,
that is the final trade amount set at Taker Bond time
Adds context for onchain swap.
"""
if not cls.is_buyer(order, user):
return False, None
if user == order.maker:
fee_fraction = FEE * MAKER_FEE_SPLIT
elif user == order.taker:
fee_fraction = FEE * (1 - MAKER_FEE_SPLIT)
fee_sats = order.last_satoshis * fee_fraction
context = {}
# context necessary for the user to submit a LN invoice
context["invoice_amount"] = round(
order.last_satoshis - fee_sats
) # Trading fee to buyer is charged here.
# context necessary for the user to submit an onchain address
MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT = config("MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT", cast=int, default=20_000)
MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT = config("MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT", cast=int, default=500_000)
if context["invoice_amount"] < MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT:
context["swap_allowed"] = False
context[
"swap_failure_reason"
] = f"Order amount is smaller than the minimum swap available of {MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT} Sats"
order.log(
f"Onchain payment option was not offered: amount is smaller than the minimum swap available of {MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT} Sats",
level="WARN",
)
return True, context
elif context["invoice_amount"] > MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT:
context["swap_allowed"] = False
context[
"swap_failure_reason"
] = f"Order amount is bigger than the maximum swap available of {MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT} Sats"
order.log(
f"Onchain payment option was not offered: amount is bigger than the maximum swap available of {MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT} Sats",
level="WARN",
)
return True, context
if config("DISABLE_ONCHAIN", cast=bool, default=True):
context["swap_allowed"] = False
context["swap_failure_reason"] = "On-the-fly submarine swaps are disabled"
order.log(
"Onchain payment option was not offered: on-the-fly submarine swaps are disabled"
)
return True, context
if order.payout_tx is None:
# Creates the OnchainPayment object and checks node balance
valid = cls.create_onchain_payment(
order, user, preliminary_amount=context["invoice_amount"]
)
order.log(
f"Suggested mining fee is {order.payout_tx.suggested_mining_fee_rate} Sats/vbyte, the swap fee rate is {order.payout_tx.swap_fee_rate}%"
)
if not valid:
context["swap_allowed"] = False
context[
"swap_failure_reason"
] = "Not enough onchain liquidity available to offer a swap"
order.log(
"Onchain payment option was not offered: onchain liquidity available to offer a swap",
level="WARN",
)
return True, context
context["swap_allowed"] = True
context["suggested_mining_fee_rate"] = order.payout_tx.suggested_mining_fee_rate
context["swap_fee_rate"] = order.payout_tx.swap_fee_rate
return True, context
@classmethod
def escrow_amount(cls, order, user):
"""Computes escrow invoice amount. Uses order.last_satoshis,
that is the final trade amount set at Taker Bond time"""
if user == order.maker:
fee_fraction = FEE * MAKER_FEE_SPLIT
elif user == order.taker:
fee_fraction = FEE * (1 - MAKER_FEE_SPLIT)
fee_sats = order.last_satoshis * fee_fraction
if cls.is_seller(order, user):
escrow_amount = round(
order.last_satoshis + fee_sats
) # Trading fee to seller is charged here.
return True, {"escrow_amount": escrow_amount}
@classmethod
def update_address(cls, order, user, address, mining_fee_rate):
# Empty address?
if not address:
return False, {"bad_address": "You submitted an empty address"}
# only the buyer can post a buyer address
if not cls.is_buyer(order, user):
return False, {
"bad_request": "Only the buyer of this order can provide a payout address."
}
# not the right time to submit
if not (
order.taker_bond.status
== order.maker_bond.status
== LNPayment.Status.LOCKED
) or order.status not in [Order.Status.WFI, Order.Status.WF2]:
order.log(
f"Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) attempted to submit an address while the order was in status {order.status}",
level="ERROR",
)
return False, {"bad_request": "You cannot submit an address now."}
# not a valid address
valid, context = validate_onchain_address(address)
if not valid:
order.log(f"The address {address} is not valid", level="WARN")
return False, context
num_satoshis = cls.payout_amount(order, user)[1]["invoice_amount"]
if mining_fee_rate:
# not a valid mining fee
min_mining_fee_rate = LNNode.estimate_fee(
amount_sats=num_satoshis,
target_conf=config("MINIMUM_TARGET_CONF", cast=int, default=24),
)["mining_fee_rate"]
min_mining_fee_rate = max(2, min_mining_fee_rate)
if float(mining_fee_rate) < min_mining_fee_rate:
order.log(
f"The onchain fee {float(mining_fee_rate)} Sats/vbytes proposed by Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) is less than the current minimum mining fee {min_mining_fee_rate} Sats",
level="WARN",
)
return False, {
"bad_address": f"The mining fee is too low. Must be higher than {min_mining_fee_rate} Sat/vbyte"
}
elif float(mining_fee_rate) > 500:
order.log(
f"The onchain fee {float(mining_fee_rate)} Sats/vbytes proposed by Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) is higher than the absolute maximum mining fee 500 Sats",
level="WARN",
)
return False, {
"bad_address": "The mining fee is too high, must be less than 500 Sats/vbyte"
}
order.payout_tx.mining_fee_rate = float(mining_fee_rate)
# If not mining fee provider use backend's suggested fee rate
else:
order.payout_tx.mining_fee_rate = order.payout_tx.suggested_mining_fee_rate
tx = order.payout_tx
tx.address = address
tx.mining_fee_sats = int(tx.mining_fee_rate * 280)
tx.num_satoshis = num_satoshis
tx.sent_satoshis = int(
float(tx.num_satoshis)
- float(tx.num_satoshis) * float(tx.swap_fee_rate) / 100
- float(tx.mining_fee_sats)
)
if float(tx.sent_satoshis) < 20_000:
order.log(
f"The onchain Sats to be sent ({float(tx.sent_satoshis)}) are below the dust limit of 20,000 Sats",
level="WARN",
)
return False, {
"bad_address": "The amount remaining after subtracting mining fee is close to dust limit."
}
tx.status = OnchainPayment.Status.VALID
tx.save()
order.is_swap = True
order.save(update_fields=["is_swap"])
order.log(
f"Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) added an onchain address OnchainPayment({tx.id},{address[:6]}...{address[-4:]}) as payout method. Amount to be sent is {tx.sent_satoshis} Sats, mining fee is {tx.mining_fee_sats} Sats"
)
cls.move_state_updated_payout_method(order)
return True, None
@classmethod
def update_invoice(cls, order, user, invoice, routing_budget_ppm):
# Empty invoice?
if not invoice:
order.log(
f"Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) submitted an empty invoice",
level="WARN",
)
return False, {"bad_invoice": "You submitted an empty invoice"}
# only the buyer can post a buyer invoice
if not cls.is_buyer(order, user):
return False, {
"bad_request": "Only the buyer of this order can provide a buyer invoice."
}
if not order.taker_bond:
return False, {"bad_request": "Wait for your order to be taken."}
if (
not (
order.taker_bond.status
== order.maker_bond.status
== LNPayment.Status.LOCKED
)
and not order.status == Order.Status.FAI
):
return False, {
"bad_request": "You cannot submit an invoice while bonds are not locked."
}
if order.status == Order.Status.FAI:
if order.payout.status != LNPayment.Status.EXPIRE:
return False, {
"bad_request": "You can only submit an invoice after expiration or 3 failed attempts"
}
# cancel onchain_payout if existing
cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order)
num_satoshis = cls.payout_amount(order, user)[1]["invoice_amount"]
routing_budget_sats = float(num_satoshis) * (
float(routing_budget_ppm) / 1_000_000
)
num_satoshis = int(num_satoshis - routing_budget_sats)
payout = LNNode.validate_ln_invoice(invoice, num_satoshis, routing_budget_ppm)
if not payout["valid"]:
return False, payout["context"]
order.payout, _ = LNPayment.objects.update_or_create(
concept=LNPayment.Concepts.PAYBUYER,
type=LNPayment.Types.NORM,
sender=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
# In case this user has other payouts, update the one related to this order.
order_paid_LN=order,
receiver=user,
routing_budget_ppm=routing_budget_ppm,
routing_budget_sats=routing_budget_sats,
# if there is a LNPayment matching these above, it updates that one with defaults below.
defaults={
"invoice": invoice,
"status": LNPayment.Status.VALIDI,
"num_satoshis": num_satoshis,
"description": payout["description"],
"payment_hash": payout["payment_hash"],
"created_at": payout["created_at"],
"expires_at": payout["expires_at"],
},
)
order.is_swap = False
order.save(update_fields=["payout", "is_swap"])
order.log(
f"Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) added the invoice LNPayment({order.payout.payment_hash},{order.payout.payment_hash}) as payout method. Amount to be sent is {order.payout.num_satoshis} Sats, routing budget is {order.payout.routing_budget_sats} Sats ({order.payout.routing_budget_ppm}ppm)"
)
cls.move_state_updated_payout_method(order)
return True, None
@classmethod
def move_state_updated_payout_method(cls, order):
# If the order status is 'Waiting for invoice'. Move forward to 'chat'
if order.status == Order.Status.WFI:
order.update_status(Order.Status.CHA)
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA)
)
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="fiat_exchange_starts")
# If the order status is 'Waiting for both'. Move forward to 'waiting for escrow'
elif order.status == Order.Status.WF2:
# If the escrow does not exist, or is not locked move to WFE.
if order.trade_escrow is None:
order.update_status(Order.Status.WFE)
# If the escrow is locked move to Chat.
elif order.trade_escrow.status == LNPayment.Status.LOCKED:
order.update_status(Order.Status.CHA)
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA)
)
send_notification.delay(
order_id=order.id, message="fiat_exchange_starts"
)
else:
order.update_status(Order.Status.WFE)
# If the order status is 'Failed Routing'. Retry payment.
elif order.status == Order.Status.FAI:
if LNNode.double_check_htlc_is_settled(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
order.update_status(Order.Status.PAY)
order.payout.status = LNPayment.Status.FLIGHT
order.payout.routing_attempts = 0
order.payout.save(update_fields=["status", "routing_attempts"])
order.save(update_fields=["expires_at"])
return True
def is_penalized(user):
"""Checks if a user that is not participant of orders
has a limit on taking or making a order"""
if user.robot.penalty_expiration:
if user.robot.penalty_expiration > timezone.now():
time_out = (user.robot.penalty_expiration - timezone.now()).seconds
return True, time_out
return False, None
@classmethod
def cancel_order(cls, order, user, state=None):
# Do not change order status if an is in order
# any of these status
do_not_cancel = [
Order.Status.UCA,
Order.Status.EXP,
Order.Status.TLD,
Order.Status.DIS,
Order.Status.CCA,
Order.Status.PAY,
Order.Status.SUC,
Order.Status.FAI,
Order.Status.MLD,
]
if order.status in do_not_cancel:
return False, {"bad_request": "You cannot cancel this order"}
# 1) When maker cancels before bond
# The order never shows up on the book and order
# status becomes "cancelled"
if order.status == Order.Status.WFB and order.maker == user:
cls.cancel_bond(order.maker_bond)
order.update_status(Order.Status.UCA)
order.log("Order expired while waiting for maker bond")
order.log("Maker bond was cancelled")
return True, None
# 2.a) When maker cancels after bond
#
# The order disapears from book and goes to cancelled. If strict, maker is charged the bond
# to prevent DDOS on the LN node and order book. If not strict, maker is returned
# the bond (more user friendly).
elif (
order.status in [Order.Status.PUB, Order.Status.PAU] and order.maker == user
):
# Return the maker bond (Maker gets returned the bond for cancelling public order)
if cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond):
order.update_status(Order.Status.UCA)
send_notification.delay(
order_id=order.id, message="public_order_cancelled"
)
order.log("Order cancelled by maker while public or paused")
order.log("Maker bond was unlocked")
return True, None
# 2.b) When maker cancels after bond and before taker bond is locked
#
# The order dissapears from book and goes to cancelled.
# The bond maker bond is returned.
elif order.status == Order.Status.TAK and order.maker == user:
# Return the maker bond (Maker gets returned the bond for cancelling public order)
if cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond):
cls.cancel_bond(order.taker_bond)
order.update_status(Order.Status.UCA)
send_notification.delay(
order_id=order.id, message="public_order_cancelled"
)
order.log("Order cancelled by maker before the taker locked the bond")
order.log("Maker bond was unlocked")
order.log("Taker bond was cancelled")
return True, None
# 3) When taker cancels before bond
# The order goes back to the book as public.
# LNPayment "order.taker_bond" is deleted()
elif order.status == Order.Status.TAK and order.taker == user:
# adds a timeout penalty
cls.cancel_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.kick_taker(order)
order.log("Taker cancelled before locking the bond")
return True, None
# 4) When taker or maker cancel after bond (before escrow)
#
# The order goes into cancelled status if maker cancels.
# The order goes into the public book if taker cancels.
# In both cases there is a small fee.
# 4.a) When maker cancel after bond (before escrow)
# The order into cancelled status if maker cancels.
elif (
order.status in [Order.Status.WF2, Order.Status.WFE] and order.maker == user
):
# cancel onchain payment if existing
cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order)
# Settle the maker bond (Maker loses the bond for canceling an ongoing trade)
valid = cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond) # returns taker bond
cls.cancel_escrow(order)
if valid:
order.update_status(Order.Status.UCA)
# Reward taker with part of the maker bond
cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond)
order.log("Maker cancelled before escrow was locked")
order.log("Maker bond was settled")
order.log("Taker bond was unlocked")
return True, None
# 4.b) When taker cancel after bond (before escrow)
# The order into cancelled status if mtker cancels.
elif (
order.status in [Order.Status.WF2, Order.Status.WFE] and order.taker == user
):
# cancel onchain payment if existing
cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order)
# Settle the maker bond (Maker loses the bond for canceling an ongoing trade)
valid = cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
if valid:
taker_bond = order.taker_bond
cls.publish_order(order)
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_published")
# Reward maker with part of the taker bond
cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, taker_bond, order.maker_bond)
order.log("Taker cancelled before escrow was locked")
order.log("Taker bond was settled")
order.log("Maker bond was unlocked")
return True, None
# 5) When trade collateral has been posted (after escrow)
#
# Always goes to CCA status. Collaboration is needed.
# When a user asks for cancel, 'order.m/t/aker_asked_cancel' goes True.
# When the second user asks for cancel. Order is totally cancelled.
# Must have a small cost for both parties to prevent node DDOS.
elif order.status in [Order.Status.WFI, Order.Status.CHA]:
# if the maker had asked, and now the taker does: cancel order, return everything
if order.maker_asked_cancel and user == order.taker:
cls.collaborative_cancel(order)
order.log(
f"Taker Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) accepted the collaborative cancellation"
)
return True, None
# if the taker had asked, and now the maker does: cancel order, return everything
elif order.taker_asked_cancel and user == order.maker:
cls.collaborative_cancel(order)
order.log(
f"Maker Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) accepted the collaborative cancellation"
)
return True, None
# Otherwise just make true the asked for cancel flags
elif user == order.taker:
order.taker_asked_cancel = True
order.save(update_fields=["taker_asked_cancel"])
order.log(
f"Taker Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) asked for collaborative cancellation"
)
return True, None
elif user == order.maker:
order.maker_asked_cancel = True
order.save(update_fields=["maker_asked_cancel"])
order.log(
f"Maker Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) asked for collaborative cancellation"
)
return True, None
else:
order.log(
f"Cancel request was sent by Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) on an invalid status {order.status}: {Order.Status(order.status).label}"
)
return False, {"bad_request": "You cannot cancel this order"}
@classmethod
def collaborative_cancel(cls, order):
if order.status not in [Order.Status.WFI, Order.Status.CHA]:
return
# cancel onchain payment if existing
cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order)
cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond)
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.return_escrow(order)
order.update_status(Order.Status.CCA)
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="collaborative_cancelled")
order.log("Order was collaboratively cancelled")
order.log("Maker bond was unlocked")
order.log("Taker bond was unlocked")
order.log("Trade escrow was unlocked")
return
@classmethod
def publish_order(cls, order):
order.status = Order.Status.PUB
order.expires_at = order.created_at + timedelta(
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.PUB)
)
if order.has_range:
order.amount = None
order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order)
order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now()
# clear fields in case of re-publishing after expiry
order.taker = None
order.taker_bond = None
order.trade_escrow = None
order.payout = None
order.payout_tx = None
order.save() # update all fields
order.log(f"Order({order.id},{str(order)}) is public in the order book")
return
def compute_cltv_expiry_blocks(order, invoice_concept):
"""Computes timelock CLTV expiry of the last hop in blocks for hodl invoices
invoice_concepts (str): maker_bond, taker_bond, trade_escrow
"""
# Every invoice_concept must be locked by at least the fiat exchange duration
# Every invoice must also be locked for deposit_time (order.escrow_duration or WFE status)
cltv_expiry_secs = order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA)
cltv_expiry_secs += order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WFE)
# Maker bond must also be locked for the full public duration plus the taker bond locking time
if invoice_concept == "maker_bond":
cltv_expiry_secs += order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.PUB)
cltv_expiry_secs += order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK)
# Add a safety marging by multiplying by the maxium expected mining network speed up
safe_cltv_expiry_secs = cltv_expiry_secs * MAX_MINING_NETWORK_SPEEDUP_EXPECTED
# Convert to blocks using assummed average block time (~8 mins/block)
cltv_expiry_blocks = int(safe_cltv_expiry_secs / (BLOCK_TIME * 60))
return cltv_expiry_blocks
@classmethod
def gen_maker_hold_invoice(cls, order, user):
# Do not gen and cancel if order is older than expiry time
if order.expires_at < timezone.now():
cls.order_expires(order)
return False, {
"bad_request": "Invoice expired. You did not confirm publishing the order in time. Make a new order."
}
# Return the previous invoice if there was one and is still unpaid
if order.maker_bond:
return True, {
"bond_invoice": order.maker_bond.invoice,
"bond_satoshis": order.maker_bond.num_satoshis,
}
# If there was no maker_bond object yet, generates one
order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order)
order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now()
bond_satoshis = int(order.last_satoshis * order.bond_size / 100)
if user.robot.wants_stealth:
description = f"Payment reference: {order.reference}. This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on RoboSats if the lock was successful. It will be unlocked (fail) unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally."
else:
description = f"RoboSats - Publishing '{str(order)}' - Maker bond - This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on RoboSats if the lock was successful. It will be unlocked (fail) unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally."
# Gen hold Invoice
try:
hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice(
bond_satoshis,
description,
invoice_expiry=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WFB),
cltv_expiry_blocks=cls.compute_cltv_expiry_blocks(order, "maker_bond"),
order_id=order.id,
lnpayment_concept=LNPayment.Concepts.MAKEBOND.label,
time=int(timezone.now().timestamp()),
)
except Exception as e:
print(str(e))
if "failed to connect to all addresses" in str(e):
return False, {
"bad_request": "The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware."
}
elif "wallet locked" in str(e):
return False, {
"bad_request": "This is weird, RoboSats' lightning wallet is locked. Check in the Telegram group, maybe the staff has died."
}
order.maker_bond = LNPayment.objects.create(
concept=LNPayment.Concepts.MAKEBOND,
type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD,
sender=user,
receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
invoice=hold_payment["invoice"],
preimage=hold_payment["preimage"],
status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN,
num_satoshis=bond_satoshis,
description=description,
payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"],
created_at=hold_payment["created_at"],
expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"],
cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"],
)
order.save(update_fields=["last_satoshis", "last_satoshis_time", "maker_bond"])
order.log(
f"Maker bond LNPayment({order.maker_bond.payment_hash},{str(order.maker_bond)}) was created"
)
return True, {
"bond_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"],
"bond_satoshis": bond_satoshis,
}
@classmethod
def finalize_contract(cls, order):
"""When the taker locks the taker_bond
the contract is final"""
# THE TRADE AMOUNT IS FINAL WITH THE CONFIRMATION OF THE TAKER BOND!
# (This is the last update to "last_satoshis", it becomes the escrow amount next)
order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order)
order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now()
# With the bond confirmation the order is extended 'public_order_duration' hours
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WF2)
)
order.status = Order.Status.WF2
order.save(
update_fields=[
"status",
"last_satoshis",
"last_satoshis_time",
"expires_at",
]
)
order.taker_bond.status = LNPayment.Status.LOCKED
order.taker_bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
# Both users robots are added one more contract // Unsafe can add more than once.
order.maker.robot.total_contracts += 1
order.taker.robot.total_contracts += 1
order.maker.robot.save(update_fields=["total_contracts"])
order.taker.robot.save(update_fields=["total_contracts"])
# Log a market tick
try:
market_tick = MarketTick.log_a_tick(order)
order.log(
f"New Market Tick logged as MarketTick({market_tick.id},{market_tick})"
)
except Exception:
pass
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_taken_confirmed")
order.log(
f"Contract formalized. Maker: Robot({order.maker.robot.id},{order.maker}). Taker: Robot({order.taker.robot.id},{order.taker}). API median price {order.currency.exchange_rate} {dict(Currency.currency_choices)[order.currency.currency]}/BTC. Premium is {order.premium}%. Contract size {order.last_satoshis} Sats"
)
return True
@classmethod
def gen_taker_hold_invoice(cls, order, user):
# Do not gen and kick out the taker if order is older than expiry time
if order.expires_at < timezone.now():
cls.order_expires(order)
return False, {
"bad_request": "Invoice expired. You did not confirm taking the order in time."
}
# Do not gen if a taker invoice exist. Do not return if it is already locked. Return the old one if still waiting.
if order.taker_bond:
return True, {
"bond_invoice": order.taker_bond.invoice,
"bond_satoshis": order.taker_bond.num_satoshis,
}
# If there was no taker_bond object yet, generates one
order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order)
order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now()
bond_satoshis = int(order.last_satoshis * order.bond_size / 100)
pos_text = "Buying" if cls.is_buyer(order, user) else "Selling"
if user.robot.wants_stealth:
description = f"Payment reference: {order.reference}. This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on RoboSats if the lock was successful. It will be unlocked (fail) unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally."
else:
description = (
f"RoboSats - Taking 'Order {order.id}' {pos_text} BTC for {str(float(order.amount)) + Currency.currency_dict[str(order.currency.currency)]}"
+ " - Taker bond - This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on RoboSats if the lock was successful. It will be unlocked (fail) unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally."
)
# Gen hold Invoice
try:
hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice(
bond_satoshis,
description,
invoice_expiry=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK),
cltv_expiry_blocks=cls.compute_cltv_expiry_blocks(order, "taker_bond"),
order_id=order.id,
lnpayment_concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TAKEBOND.label,
time=int(timezone.now().timestamp()),
)
except Exception as e:
if "status = StatusCode.UNAVAILABLE" in str(e):
return False, {
"bad_request": "The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware."
}
order.taker_bond = LNPayment.objects.create(
concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TAKEBOND,
type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD,
sender=user,
receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
invoice=hold_payment["invoice"],
preimage=hold_payment["preimage"],
status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN,
num_satoshis=bond_satoshis,
description=description,
payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"],
created_at=hold_payment["created_at"],
expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"],
cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"],
)
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK)
)
order.save(
update_fields=[
"expires_at",
"last_satoshis_time",
"taker_bond",
"expires_at",
]
)
order.log(
f"Taker bond invoice LNPayment({hold_payment['payment_hash']},{str(order.taker_bond)}) was created"
)
return True, {
"bond_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"],
"bond_satoshis": bond_satoshis,
}
def trade_escrow_received(order):
"""Moves the order forward"""
# If status is 'Waiting for both' move to Waiting for invoice
if order.status == Order.Status.WF2:
order.update_status(Order.Status.WFI)
# If status is 'Waiting for invoice' move to Chat
elif order.status == Order.Status.WFE:
order.update_status(Order.Status.CHA)
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA)
)
order.save(update_fields=["expires_at"])
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="fiat_exchange_starts")
@classmethod
def gen_escrow_hold_invoice(cls, order, user):
# Do not generate if escrow deposit time has expired
if order.expires_at < timezone.now():
cls.order_expires(order)
return False, {
"bad_request": "Invoice expired. You did not send the escrow in time."
}
# Do not gen if an escrow invoice exist. Do not return if it is already locked. Return the old one if still waiting.
if order.trade_escrow:
return True, {
"escrow_invoice": order.trade_escrow.invoice,
"escrow_satoshis": order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis,
}
# If there was no taker_bond object yet, generate one
escrow_satoshis = cls.escrow_amount(order, user)[1][
"escrow_amount"
] # Amount was fixed when taker bond was locked, fee applied here
order.log(f"Escrow invoice amount is calculated as {escrow_satoshis} Sats")
if user.robot.wants_stealth:
description = f"Payment reference: {order.reference}. This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on RoboSats if the lock was successful. It will be unlocked (fail) unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally."
else:
description = f"RoboSats - Escrow amount for '{str(order)}' - It WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET. It will be released to the buyer once you confirm you received the fiat. It will automatically return if buyer does not confirm the payment."
# Gen hold Invoice
try:
hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice(
escrow_satoshis,
description,
invoice_expiry=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WF2),
cltv_expiry_blocks=cls.compute_cltv_expiry_blocks(
order, "trade_escrow"
),
order_id=order.id,
lnpayment_concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TRESCROW.label,
time=int(timezone.now().timestamp()),
)
except Exception as e:
if "status = StatusCode.UNAVAILABLE" in str(e):
return False, {
"bad_request": "The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware."
}
order.trade_escrow = LNPayment.objects.create(
concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TRESCROW,
type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD,
sender=user,
receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
invoice=hold_payment["invoice"],
preimage=hold_payment["preimage"],
status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN,
num_satoshis=escrow_satoshis,
description=description,
payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"],
created_at=hold_payment["created_at"],
expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"],
cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"],
)
order.save(update_fields=["trade_escrow"])
order.log(
f"Trade escrow invoice LNPayment({hold_payment['payment_hash']},{str(order.trade_escrow)}) was created"
)
return True, {
"escrow_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"],
"escrow_satoshis": escrow_satoshis,
}
def settle_escrow(order):
"""Settles the trade escrow hold invoice"""
if LNNode.settle_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.preimage):
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"])
order.log("Trade escrow was settled")
return True
def settle_bond(bond):
"""Settles the bond hold invoice"""
if LNNode.settle_hold_invoice(bond.preimage):
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
return True
def return_escrow(order):
"""returns the trade escrow"""
if LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.RETNED
order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"])
order.log("Trade escrow was unlocked")
return True
def cancel_escrow(order):
"""returns the trade escrow"""
# Same as return escrow, but used when the invoice was never LOCKED
if LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.CANCEL
order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"])
order.log("Trade escrow was cancelled")
return True
def return_bond(bond):
"""returns a bond"""
if bond is None:
return
try:
LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(bond.payment_hash)
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.RETNED
bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
return True
except Exception as e:
if "invoice already settled" in str(e):
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
return True
else:
raise e
def cancel_onchain_payment(order):
"""Cancel onchain_payment if existing"""
if order.payout_tx:
order.payout_tx.status = OnchainPayment.Status.CANCE
order.payout_tx.save(update_fields=["status"])
order.log(
f"Onchain payment OnchainPayment({order.payout_tx.id},{str(order.payout_tx)}) was cancelled"
)
return True
else:
return False
def cancel_bond(bond):
"""cancel a bond"""
# Same as return bond, but used when the invoice was never LOCKED
if bond is None:
return True
try:
LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(bond.payment_hash)
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.CANCEL
bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
return True
except Exception as e:
if "invoice already settled" in str(e):
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
return True
else:
raise e
@classmethod
def pay_buyer(cls, order):
"""Pays buyer invoice or onchain address"""
# Pay to buyer invoice
if not order.is_swap:
# Background process "follow_invoices" will try to pay this invoice until success
order.payout.status = LNPayment.Status.FLIGHT
order.payout.save(update_fields=["status"])
order.update_status(Order.Status.PAY)
order.contract_finalization_time = timezone.now()
order.save(update_fields=["contract_finalization_time"])
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="trade_successful")
order.log("Paying buyer invoice")
return True
# Pay onchain to address
else:
if not order.payout_tx.status == OnchainPayment.Status.VALID:
return False
else:
# Add onchain payment to queue
order.payout_tx.status = OnchainPayment.Status.QUEUE
order.payout_tx.save(update_fields=["status"])
order.update_status(Order.Status.SUC)
order.contract_finalization_time = timezone.now()
order.save(update_fields=["contract_finalization_time"])
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="trade_successful")
order.log("Paying buyer onchain address")
return True
@classmethod
def confirm_fiat(cls, order, user):
"""If Order is in the CHAT states:
If user is buyer: fiat_sent goes to true.
If User is seller and fiat_sent is true: settle the escrow and pay buyer invoice!
"""
if order.status == Order.Status.CHA or order.status == Order.Status.FSE:
# If buyer mark fiat sent
if cls.is_buyer(order, user):
order.update_status(Order.Status.FSE)
order.is_fiat_sent = True
order.save(update_fields=["is_fiat_sent"])
order.log("Buyer confirmed 'fiat sent'")
# If seller and fiat was sent, SETTLE ESCROW AND PAY BUYER INVOICE
elif cls.is_seller(order, user):
if not order.is_fiat_sent:
return False, {
"bad_request": "You cannot confirm to have received the fiat before it is confirmed to be sent by the buyer."
}
# Make sure the trade escrow is at least as big as the buyer invoice
num_satoshis = (
order.payout_tx.num_satoshis
if order.is_swap
else order.payout.num_satoshis
)
if order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis <= num_satoshis:
return False, {
"bad_request": "Woah, something broke badly. Report in the public channels, or open a Github Issue."
}
# !!! KEY LINE - SETTLES THE TRADE ESCROW !!!
if cls.settle_escrow(order):
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"])
# Double check the escrow is settled.
if LNNode.double_check_htlc_is_settled(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
# RETURN THE BONDS
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond)
order.log("Taker bond was unlocked")
order.log("Maker bond was unlocked")
# !!! KEY LINE - PAYS THE BUYER INVOICE !!!
cls.pay_buyer(order)
# Computes coordinator trade revenue
cls.compute_proceeds(order)
return True, None
else:
return False, {
"bad_request": "You cannot confirm the fiat payment at this stage"
}
return True, None
@classmethod
def undo_confirm_fiat_sent(cls, order, user):
"""If Order is in the CHAT states:
If user is buyer: fiat_sent goes to true.
"""
if not cls.is_buyer(order, user):
return False, {
"bad_request": "Only the buyer can undo the fiat sent confirmation."
}
if order.status != Order.Status.FSE:
return False, {
"bad_request": "Only orders in Chat and with fiat sent confirmed can be reverted."
}
order.update_status(Order.Status.CHA)
order.is_fiat_sent = False
order.reverted_fiat_sent = True
order.save(update_fields=["is_fiat_sent", "reverted_fiat_sent"])
order.log(
f"Buyer Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) reverted the confirmation of 'fiat sent'"
)
return True, None
def pause_unpause_public_order(order, user):
if not order.maker == user:
return False, {
"bad_request": "You cannot pause or unpause an order you did not make"
}
else:
if order.status == Order.Status.PUB:
order.update_status(Order.Status.PAU)
order.log(
f"Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) paused the public order"
)
elif order.status == Order.Status.PAU:
order.update_status(Order.Status.PUB)
order.log(
f"Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) made public the paused order"
)
else:
order.log(
f"Robot({user.robot.id},{user.username}) tried to pause/unpause an order that was not public or paused",
level="WARN",
)
return False, {
"bad_request": "You can only pause/unpause an order that is either public or paused"
}
return True, None
@classmethod
def rate_platform(cls, user, rating):
user.robot.platform_rating = rating
user.robot.save(update_fields=["platform_rating"])
return True, None
@classmethod
def add_slashed_rewards(cls, order, slashed_bond, staked_bond):
"""
When a bond is slashed due to overtime, rewards the user that was waiting.
slashed_bond is the bond settled by the robot who forfeits his bond.
staked_bond is the bond that was at stake by the robot who is rewarded.
It may happen that the Sats at stake by the maker are larger than the Sats
at stake by the taker (range amount orders where the taker does not take the
maximum available). In those cases, the change is added back also to the robot
that was slashed (discounted by the forfeited amount).
"""
reward_fraction = config("SLASHED_BOND_REWARD_SPLIT", cast=float, default=0.5)
if staked_bond.num_satoshis < slashed_bond.num_satoshis:
slashed_satoshis = min(slashed_bond.num_satoshis, staked_bond.num_satoshis)
slashed_return = int(slashed_bond.num_satoshis - slashed_satoshis)
else:
slashed_satoshis = slashed_bond.num_satoshis
slashed_return = 0
reward = int(slashed_satoshis * reward_fraction)
rewarded_robot = staked_bond.sender.robot
rewarded_robot.earned_rewards += reward
rewarded_robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"])
slashed_robot_log = ""
if slashed_return > 100:
slashed_robot = slashed_bond.sender.robot
slashed_robot.earned_rewards += slashed_return
slashed_robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"])
slashed_robot_log = "Robot({slashed_robot.id},{slashed_robot.user.username}) was returned {slashed_return} Sats)"
new_proceeds = int(slashed_satoshis * (1 - reward_fraction))
order.proceeds += new_proceeds
order.save(update_fields=["proceeds"])
send_devfund_donation.delay(order.id, new_proceeds, "slashed bond")
order.log(
f"Robot({rewarded_robot.id},{rewarded_robot.user.username}) was rewarded {reward} Sats. {slashed_robot_log}"
)
return
@classmethod
def withdraw_rewards(cls, user, invoice):
# only a user with positive withdraw balance can use this
if user.robot.earned_rewards < 1:
return False, {"bad_invoice": "You have not earned rewards"}
num_satoshis = user.robot.earned_rewards
routing_budget_sats = int(
max(
num_satoshis * float(config("PROPORTIONAL_ROUTING_FEE_LIMIT")),
float(config("MIN_FLAT_ROUTING_FEE_LIMIT_REWARD")),
)
) # 1000 ppm or 10 sats
routing_budget_ppm = (routing_budget_sats / float(num_satoshis)) * 1_000_000
reward_payout = LNNode.validate_ln_invoice(
invoice, num_satoshis, routing_budget_ppm
)
if not reward_payout["valid"]:
return False, reward_payout["context"]
try:
lnpayment = LNPayment.objects.create(
concept=LNPayment.Concepts.WITHREWA,
type=LNPayment.Types.NORM,
sender=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
status=LNPayment.Status.VALIDI,
receiver=user,
invoice=invoice,
num_satoshis=num_satoshis,
description=reward_payout["description"],
payment_hash=reward_payout["payment_hash"],
created_at=reward_payout["created_at"],
expires_at=reward_payout["expires_at"],
)
# Might fail if payment_hash already exists in DB
except Exception:
return False, {"bad_invoice": "Give me a new invoice"}
user.robot.earned_rewards = 0
user.robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"])
# Pays the invoice.
paid, failure_reason = LNNode.pay_invoice(lnpayment)
if paid:
user.robot.earned_rewards = 0
user.robot.claimed_rewards += num_satoshis
user.robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards", "claimed_rewards"])
return True, None
# If fails, adds the rewards again.
else:
user.robot.earned_rewards = num_satoshis
user.robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"])
context = {}
context["bad_invoice"] = failure_reason
return False, context
@classmethod
def compute_proceeds(cls, order):
"""
Computes Coordinator trade proceeds for finished orders.
"""
if order.is_swap:
payout_sats = (
order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis + order.payout_tx.mining_fee_sats
)
new_proceeds = int(order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - payout_sats)
else:
payout_sats = order.payout.num_satoshis + order.payout.fee
new_proceeds = int(order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - payout_sats)
order.proceeds += new_proceeds
order.save(update_fields=["proceeds"])
order.log(
f"Order({order.id},{str(order)}) proceedings are incremented by {new_proceeds} Sats, totalling {order.proceeds} Sats"
)
send_devfund_donation.delay(order.id, new_proceeds, "successful order")
@classmethod
def summarize_trade(cls, order, user):
"""
Summarizes a finished order. Returns a dict with
amounts, fees, costs, etc, for buyer and seller.
"""
if order.status not in [Order.Status.SUC, Order.Status.PAY, Order.Status.FAI]:
return False, {"bad_summary": "Order has not finished yet"}
context = {}
users = {"taker": order.taker, "maker": order.maker}
for order_user in users:
summary = {}
summary["trade_fee_percent"] = (
FEE * MAKER_FEE_SPLIT
if order_user == "maker"
else FEE * (1 - MAKER_FEE_SPLIT)
)
summary["bond_size_sats"] = (
order.maker_bond.num_satoshis
if order_user == "maker"
else order.taker_bond.num_satoshis
)
summary["bond_size_percent"] = order.bond_size
summary["is_buyer"] = cls.is_buyer(order, users[order_user])
if summary["is_buyer"]:
summary["sent_fiat"] = order.amount
if order.is_swap:
summary["received_sats"] = order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis
else:
summary["received_sats"] = order.payout.num_satoshis
summary["payment_hash"] = order.payout.payment_hash
summary["preimage"] = order.payout.preimage
summary["trade_fee_sats"] = round(
order.last_satoshis
- summary["received_sats"]
- (order.payout.routing_budget_sats if not order.is_swap else 0)
)
# Only add context for swap costs if the user is the swap recipient. Peer should not know whether it was a swap
if users[order_user] == user and order.is_swap:
summary["is_swap"] = order.is_swap
summary["received_onchain_sats"] = order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis
summary["address"] = order.payout_tx.address
summary["txid"] = order.payout_tx.txid
summary["mining_fee_sats"] = order.payout_tx.mining_fee_sats
summary["swap_fee_sats"] = round(
order.payout_tx.num_satoshis
- order.payout_tx.mining_fee_sats
- order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis
)
summary["swap_fee_percent"] = order.payout_tx.swap_fee_rate
summary["trade_fee_sats"] = round(
order.last_satoshis
- summary["received_sats"]
- summary["mining_fee_sats"]
- summary["swap_fee_sats"]
)
else:
summary["sent_sats"] = order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis
summary["received_fiat"] = order.amount
summary["trade_fee_sats"] = round(
summary["sent_sats"] - order.last_satoshis
)
context[f"{order_user}_summary"] = summary
platform_summary = {}
platform_summary["contract_exchange_rate"] = float(order.amount) / (
float(order.last_satoshis) / 100_000_000
)
if order.last_satoshis_time is not None:
platform_summary["contract_timestamp"] = order.last_satoshis_time
if order.contract_finalization_time is None:
order.contract_finalization_time = timezone.now()
order.save(update_fields=["contract_finalization_time"])
platform_summary["contract_total_time"] = (
order.contract_finalization_time - order.last_satoshis_time
)
if not order.is_swap:
platform_summary["routing_budget_sats"] = order.payout.routing_budget_sats
platform_summary["trade_revenue_sats"] = int(
order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - order.payout.num_satoshis
)
else:
platform_summary["routing_fee_sats"] = 0
platform_summary["trade_revenue_sats"] = int(
order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - order.payout_tx.num_satoshis
)
context["platform_summary"] = platform_summary
return True, context