import math from datetime import timedelta from decouple import config from django.contrib.auth.models import User from django.db.models import Q, Sum from django.utils import timezone from api.lightning.node import LNNode from api.models import Currency, LNPayment, MarketTick, OnchainPayment, Order from api.tasks import send_notification from api.utils import validate_onchain_address from chat.models import Message FEE = float(config("FEE")) MAKER_FEE_SPLIT = float(config("MAKER_FEE_SPLIT")) ESCROW_USERNAME = config("ESCROW_USERNAME") PENALTY_TIMEOUT = int(config("PENALTY_TIMEOUT")) MIN_TRADE = int(config("MIN_TRADE")) MAX_TRADE = int(config("MAX_TRADE")) EXP_MAKER_BOND_INVOICE = int(config("EXP_MAKER_BOND_INVOICE")) EXP_TAKER_BOND_INVOICE = int(config("EXP_TAKER_BOND_INVOICE")) BLOCK_TIME = float(config("BLOCK_TIME")) MAX_MINING_NETWORK_SPEEDUP_EXPECTED = float( config("MAX_MINING_NETWORK_SPEEDUP_EXPECTED") ) INVOICE_AND_ESCROW_DURATION = int(config("INVOICE_AND_ESCROW_DURATION")) FIAT_EXCHANGE_DURATION = int(config("FIAT_EXCHANGE_DURATION")) class Logics: @classmethod def validate_already_maker_or_taker(cls, user): """Validates if a use is already not part of an active order""" active_order_status = [ Order.Status.WFB, Order.Status.PUB, Order.Status.PAU, Order.Status.TAK, Order.Status.WF2, Order.Status.WFE, Order.Status.WFI, Order.Status.CHA, Order.Status.FSE, Order.Status.DIS, Order.Status.WFR, ] """Checks if the user is already partipant of an active order""" queryset = Order.objects.filter(maker=user, status__in=active_order_status) if queryset.exists(): return ( False, {"bad_request": "You are already maker of an active order"}, queryset[0], ) queryset = Order.objects.filter(taker=user, status__in=active_order_status) if queryset.exists(): return ( False, {"bad_request": "You are already taker of an active order"}, queryset[0], ) # Edge case when the user is in an order that is failing payment and he is the buyer queryset = Order.objects.filter( Q(maker=user) | Q(taker=user), status__in=[Order.Status.FAI, Order.Status.PAY], ) if queryset.exists(): order = queryset[0] if cls.is_buyer(order, user): return ( False, { "bad_request": "You are still pending a payment from a recent order" }, order, ) return True, None, None @classmethod def validate_order_size(cls, order): """Validates if order size in Sats is within limits at t0""" if not order.has_range: if order.t0_satoshis > MAX_TRADE: return False, { "bad_request": "Your order is too big. It is worth " + "{:,}".format(order.t0_satoshis) + " Sats now, but the limit is " + "{:,}".format(MAX_TRADE) + " Sats" } if order.t0_satoshis < MIN_TRADE: return False, { "bad_request": "Your order is too small. It is worth " + "{:,}".format(order.t0_satoshis) + " Sats now, but the limit is " + "{:,}".format(MIN_TRADE) + " Sats" } elif order.has_range: min_sats = cls.calc_sats( order.min_amount, order.currency.exchange_rate, order.premium ) max_sats = cls.calc_sats( order.max_amount, order.currency.exchange_rate, order.premium ) if min_sats > max_sats / 1.5: return False, { "bad_request": "Maximum range amount must be at least 50 percent higher than the minimum amount" } elif max_sats > MAX_TRADE: return False, { "bad_request": "Your order maximum amount is too big. It is worth " + "{:,}".format(int(max_sats)) + " Sats now, but the limit is " + "{:,}".format(MAX_TRADE) + " Sats" } elif min_sats < MIN_TRADE: return False, { "bad_request": "Your order minimum amount is too small. It is worth " + "{:,}".format(int(min_sats)) + " Sats now, but the limit is " + "{:,}".format(MIN_TRADE) + " Sats" } elif min_sats < max_sats / 15: return False, { "bad_request": "Your order amount range is too large. Max amount can only be 15 times bigger than min amount" } return True, None def validate_amount_within_range(order, amount): if amount > float(order.max_amount) or amount < float(order.min_amount): return False, { "bad_request": "The amount specified is outside the range specified by the maker" } return True, None def user_activity_status(last_seen): if last_seen > (timezone.now() - timedelta(minutes=2)): return "Active" elif last_seen > (timezone.now() - timedelta(minutes=10)): return "Seen recently" else: return "Inactive" @classmethod def take(cls, order, user, amount=None): is_penalized, time_out = cls.is_penalized(user) if is_penalized: return False, { "bad_request", f"You need to wait {time_out} seconds to take an order", } else: if order.has_range: order.amount = amount order.taker = user order.status = Order.Status.TAK order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta( seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK) ) order.save(update_fields=["amount", "taker", "status", "expires_at"]) return True, None def is_buyer(order, user): is_maker = order.maker == user is_taker = order.taker == user return (is_maker and order.type == Order.Types.BUY) or ( is_taker and order.type == Order.Types.SELL ) def is_seller(order, user): is_maker = order.maker == user is_taker = order.taker == user return (is_maker and order.type == Order.Types.SELL) or ( is_taker and order.type == Order.Types.BUY ) def calc_sats(amount, exchange_rate, premium): exchange_rate = float(exchange_rate) premium_rate = exchange_rate * (1 + float(premium) / 100) return (float(amount) / premium_rate) * 100 * 1000 * 1000 @classmethod def satoshis_now(cls, order): """checks trade amount in sats""" if order.is_explicit: satoshis_now = order.satoshis else: amount = order.amount if order.amount is not None else order.max_amount satoshis_now = cls.calc_sats( amount, order.currency.exchange_rate, order.premium ) return int(satoshis_now) def price_and_premium_now(order): """computes order price and premium with current rates""" exchange_rate = float(order.currency.exchange_rate) if not order.is_explicit: premium = order.premium price = exchange_rate * (1 + float(premium) / 100) else: amount = order.amount if not order.has_range else order.max_amount order_rate = float(amount) / (float(order.satoshis) / 100_000_000) premium = order_rate / exchange_rate - 1 premium = int(premium * 10_000) / 100 # 2 decimals left price = order_rate significant_digits = 5 price = round( price, significant_digits - int(math.floor(math.log10(abs(price)))) - 1 ) return price, premium @classmethod def order_expires(cls, order): """General cases when time runs out.""" # Do not change order status if an order in any with # any of these status is sent to expire here does_not_expire = [ Order.Status.UCA, Order.Status.EXP, Order.Status.TLD, Order.Status.DIS, Order.Status.CCA, Order.Status.PAY, Order.Status.SUC, Order.Status.FAI, Order.Status.MLD, ] # in any case, if order is_swap and there is an onchain_payment, cancel it. if order.status not in does_not_expire: cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order) if order.status in does_not_expire: return False elif order.status == Order.Status.WFB: order.status = Order.Status.EXP order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NMBOND cls.cancel_bond(order.maker_bond) order.save(update_fields=["status", "expiry_reason"]) return True elif order.status in [Order.Status.PUB, Order.Status.PAU]: cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond) order.status = Order.Status.EXP order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NTAKEN order.save(update_fields=["status", "expiry_reason"]) send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_expired_untaken") return True elif order.status == Order.Status.TAK: cls.cancel_bond(order.taker_bond) cls.kick_taker(order) return True elif order.status == Order.Status.WF2: """Weird case where an order expires and both participants did not proceed with the contract. Likely the site was down or there was a bug. Still bonds must be charged to avoid service DDOS.""" cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond) cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond) cls.cancel_escrow(order) order.status = Order.Status.EXP order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NESINV order.save(update_fields=["status", "expiry_reason"]) return True elif order.status == Order.Status.WFE: maker_is_seller = cls.is_seller(order, order.maker) # If maker is seller, settle the bond and order goes to expired if maker_is_seller: cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond) cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond) # If seller is offline the escrow LNpayment does not exist try: cls.cancel_escrow(order) except Exception: pass order.status = Order.Status.EXP order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NESCRO order.save(update_fields=["status", "expiry_reason"]) # Reward taker with part of the maker bond cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond) return True # If maker is buyer, settle the taker's bond order goes back to public else: cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond) # If seller is offline the escrow LNpayment does not even exist try: cls.cancel_escrow(order) except Exception: pass taker_bond = order.taker_bond cls.publish_order(order) send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_published") # Reward maker with part of the taker bond cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, taker_bond, order.maker_bond) return True elif order.status == Order.Status.WFI: # The trade could happen without a buyer invoice. However, this user # is likely AFK; will probably desert the contract as well. maker_is_buyer = cls.is_buyer(order, order.maker) # If maker is buyer, settle the bond and order goes to expired if maker_is_buyer: cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond) cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond) cls.return_escrow(order) order.status = Order.Status.EXP order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NINVOI order.save(update_fields=["status", "expiry_reason"]) # Reward taker with part of the maker bond cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond) return True # If maker is seller settle the taker's bond, order goes back to public else: cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond) cls.return_escrow(order) taker_bond = order.taker_bond cls.publish_order(order) send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_published") # Reward maker with part of the taker bond cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, taker_bond, order.maker_bond) return True elif order.status in [Order.Status.CHA, Order.Status.FSE]: # Another weird case. The time to confirm 'fiat sent or received' expired. Yet no dispute # was opened. Hint: a seller-scammer could persuade a buyer to not click "fiat # sent", we assume this is a dispute case by default. cls.open_dispute(order) return True @classmethod def kick_taker(cls, order): """The taker did not lock the taker_bond. Now he has to go""" # Add a time out to the taker if order.taker: robot = order.taker.robot robot.penalty_expiration = timezone.now() + timedelta( seconds=PENALTY_TIMEOUT ) robot.save(update_fields=["penalty_expiration"]) # Make order public again cls.publish_order(order) return True @classmethod def automatic_dispute_resolution(cls, order): """Simple case where a dispute can be solved with a priori knowledge. For example, a dispute that opens at expiration on an order where one of the participants never sent a message on the chat and never marked 'fiat sent'. By solving the dispute automatically before flagging it as dispute, we avoid having to settle the bonds""" # If fiat has been marked as sent, automatic dispute # resolution is not possible. if order.is_fiat_sent: return False # If the order has not entered dispute due to time expire # (a user triggered it), automatic dispute resolution is # not possible. if order.expires_at >= timezone.now(): return False num_messages_taker = len( Message.objects.filter(order=order, sender=order.taker) ) num_messages_maker = len( Message.objects.filter(order=order, sender=order.maker) ) if num_messages_maker == num_messages_taker == 0: cls.return_escrow(order) cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond) cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond) order.status = Order.Status.DIS elif num_messages_maker == 0: cls.return_escrow(order) cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond) cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond) cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond) order.status = Order.Status.MLD elif num_messages_maker == 0: cls.return_escrow(order) cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond) cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond) cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.taker_bond, order.maker_bond) order.status = Order.Status.TLD else: return False order.is_disputed = True order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta( seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.DIS) ) order.save(update_fields=["status", "is_disputed", "expires_at"]) send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="dispute_opened") return True @classmethod def open_dispute(cls, order, user=None): # Always settle escrow and bonds during a dispute. Disputes # can take long to resolve, it might trigger force closure # for unresolved HTLCs) Dispute winner will have to submit a # new invoice for value of escrow + bond. valid_status_open_dispute = [ Order.Status.CHA, Order.Status.FSE, ] if order.status not in valid_status_open_dispute: return False, { "bad_request": "You cannot open a dispute of this order at this stage" } automatically_solved = cls.automatic_dispute_resolution(order) if automatically_solved: return True, None if not order.trade_escrow.status == LNPayment.Status.SETLED: cls.settle_escrow(order) cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond) cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond) order.is_disputed = True order.status = Order.Status.DIS order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta( seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.DIS) ) order.save(update_fields=["is_disputed", "status", "expires_at"]) # User could be None if a dispute is open automatically due to weird expiration. if user is not None: robot = user.robot robot.num_disputes = robot.num_disputes + 1 if robot.orders_disputes_started is None: robot.orders_disputes_started = [str(order.id)] else: robot.orders_disputes_started = list( robot.orders_disputes_started ).append(str(order.id)) robot.save(update_fields=["num_disputes", "orders_disputes_started"]) send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="dispute_opened") return True, None def dispute_statement(order, user, statement): """Updates the dispute statements""" if not order.status == Order.Status.DIS: return False, { "bad_request": "Only orders in dispute accept dispute statements" } if len(statement) > 50_000: return False, { "bad_statement": "The statement and chat logs are longer than 50,000 characters" } if len(statement) < 100: return False, { "bad_statement": "The statement is too short. Make sure to be thorough." } if order.maker == user: order.maker_statement = statement order.save(update_fields=["maker_statement"]) else: order.taker_statement = statement order.save(update_fields=["taker_statement"]) # If both statements are in, move status to wait for dispute resolution if order.maker_statement not in [None, ""] and order.taker_statement not in [ None, "", ]: order.status = Order.Status.WFR order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta( seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WFR) ) order.save(update_fields=["status", "expires_at"]) return True, None def compute_swap_fee_rate(balance): shape = str(config("SWAP_FEE_SHAPE")) if shape == "linear": MIN_SWAP_FEE = float(config("MIN_SWAP_FEE")) MIN_POINT = float(config("MIN_POINT")) MAX_SWAP_FEE = float(config("MAX_SWAP_FEE")) MAX_POINT = float(config("MAX_POINT")) if float(balance.onchain_fraction) > MIN_POINT: swap_fee_rate = MIN_SWAP_FEE else: slope = (MAX_SWAP_FEE - MIN_SWAP_FEE) / (MAX_POINT - MIN_POINT) swap_fee_rate = ( slope * (balance.onchain_fraction - MAX_POINT) + MAX_SWAP_FEE ) elif shape == "exponential": MIN_SWAP_FEE = float(config("MIN_SWAP_FEE")) MAX_SWAP_FEE = float(config("MAX_SWAP_FEE")) SWAP_LAMBDA = float(config("SWAP_LAMBDA")) swap_fee_rate = MIN_SWAP_FEE + (MAX_SWAP_FEE - MIN_SWAP_FEE) * math.exp( -SWAP_LAMBDA * float(balance.onchain_fraction) ) return swap_fee_rate * 100 @classmethod def create_onchain_payment(cls, order, user, preliminary_amount): """ Creates an empty OnchainPayment for order.payout_tx. It sets the fees to be applied to this order if onchain Swap is used. If the user submits a LN invoice instead. The returned OnchainPayment goes unused. """ # Make sure no invoice payout is attached to order order.payout = None # Create onchain_payment onchain_payment = OnchainPayment.objects.create(receiver=user) # Compute a safer available onchain liquidity: (confirmed_utxos - reserve - pending_outgoing_txs)) # Accounts for already committed outgoing TX for previous users. confirmed = onchain_payment.balance.onchain_confirmed reserve = 300_000 # We assume a reserve of 300K Sats (3 times higher than LND's default anchor reserve) pending_txs = OnchainPayment.objects.filter( status__in=[OnchainPayment.Status.VALID, OnchainPayment.Status.QUEUE] ).aggregate(Sum("num_satoshis"))["num_satoshis__sum"] if pending_txs is None: pending_txs = 0 available_onchain = confirmed - reserve - pending_txs if ( preliminary_amount > available_onchain ): # Not enough onchain balance to commit for this swap. return False suggested_mining_fee_rate = LNNode.estimate_fee( amount_sats=preliminary_amount, target_conf=config("SUGGESTED_TARGET_CONF", cast=int, default=2), )["mining_fee_rate"] # Hardcap mining fee suggested at 1000 sats/vbyte if suggested_mining_fee_rate > 1000: suggested_mining_fee_rate = 1000 onchain_payment.suggested_mining_fee_rate = max(2.05, suggested_mining_fee_rate) onchain_payment.swap_fee_rate = cls.compute_swap_fee_rate( onchain_payment.balance ) onchain_payment.save() order.payout_tx = onchain_payment order.save(update_fields=["payout_tx"]) return True @classmethod def payout_amount(cls, order, user): """Computes buyer invoice amount. Uses order.last_satoshis, that is the final trade amount set at Taker Bond time Adds context for onchain swap. """ if not cls.is_buyer(order, user): return False, None if user == order.maker: fee_fraction = FEE * MAKER_FEE_SPLIT elif user == order.taker: fee_fraction = FEE * (1 - MAKER_FEE_SPLIT) fee_sats = order.last_satoshis * fee_fraction context = {} # context necessary for the user to submit a LN invoice context["invoice_amount"] = round( order.last_satoshis - fee_sats ) # Trading fee to buyer is charged here. # context necessary for the user to submit an onchain address MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT = config("MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT", cast=int, default=20_000) MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT = config("MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT", cast=int, default=500_000) if context["invoice_amount"] < MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT: context["swap_allowed"] = False context[ "swap_failure_reason" ] = f"Order amount is smaller than the minimum swap available of {MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT} Sats" return True, context elif context["invoice_amount"] > MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT: context["swap_allowed"] = False context[ "swap_failure_reason" ] = f"Order amount is bigger than the maximum swap available of {MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT} Sats" return True, context if config("DISABLE_ONCHAIN", cast=bool, default=True): context["swap_allowed"] = False context["swap_failure_reason"] = "On-the-fly submarine swaps are dissabled" return True, context if order.payout_tx is None: # Creates the OnchainPayment object and checks node balance valid = cls.create_onchain_payment( order, user, preliminary_amount=context["invoice_amount"] ) if not valid: context["swap_allowed"] = False context[ "swap_failure_reason" ] = "Not enough onchain liquidity available to offer a swap" return True, context context["swap_allowed"] = True context["suggested_mining_fee_rate"] = order.payout_tx.suggested_mining_fee_rate context["swap_fee_rate"] = order.payout_tx.swap_fee_rate return True, context @classmethod def escrow_amount(cls, order, user): """Computes escrow invoice amount. Uses order.last_satoshis, that is the final trade amount set at Taker Bond time""" if user == order.maker: fee_fraction = FEE * MAKER_FEE_SPLIT elif user == order.taker: fee_fraction = FEE * (1 - MAKER_FEE_SPLIT) fee_sats = order.last_satoshis * fee_fraction if cls.is_seller(order, user): escrow_amount = round( order.last_satoshis + fee_sats ) # Trading fee to seller is charged here. return True, {"escrow_amount": escrow_amount} @classmethod def update_address(cls, order, user, address, mining_fee_rate): # Empty address? if not address: return False, {"bad_address": "You submitted an empty invoice"} # only the buyer can post a buyer address if not cls.is_buyer(order, user): return False, { "bad_request": "Only the buyer of this order can provide a payout address." } # not the right time to submit if not ( order.taker_bond.status == order.maker_bond.status == LNPayment.Status.LOCKED ) or order.status not in [Order.Status.WFI, Order.Status.WF2]: return False, {"bad_request": "You cannot submit an address now."} # not a valid address valid, context = validate_onchain_address(address) if not valid: return False, context num_satoshis = cls.payout_amount(order, user)[1]["invoice_amount"] if mining_fee_rate: # not a valid mining fee min_mining_fee_rate = LNNode.estimate_fee( amount_sats=num_satoshis, target_conf=config("MINIMUM_TARGET_CONF", cast=int, default=24), )["mining_fee_rate"] min_mining_fee_rate = max(2, min_mining_fee_rate) if float(mining_fee_rate) < min_mining_fee_rate: return False, { "bad_address": f"The mining fee is too low. Must be higher than {min_mining_fee_rate} Sat/vbyte" } elif float(mining_fee_rate) > 500: return False, { "bad_address": "The mining fee is too high, must be less than 500 Sats/vbyte" } order.payout_tx.mining_fee_rate = float(mining_fee_rate) # If not mining fee provider use backend's suggested fee rate else: order.payout_tx.mining_fee_rate = order.payout_tx.suggested_mining_fee_rate tx = order.payout_tx tx.address = address tx.mining_fee_sats = int(tx.mining_fee_rate * 280) tx.num_satoshis = num_satoshis tx.sent_satoshis = int( float(tx.num_satoshis) - float(tx.num_satoshis) * float(tx.swap_fee_rate) / 100 - float(tx.mining_fee_sats) ) if float(tx.sent_satoshis) < 20_000: return False, { "bad_address": "The amount remaining after subtracting mining fee is close to dust limit." } tx.status = OnchainPayment.Status.VALID tx.save() order.is_swap = True order.save(update_fields=["is_swap"]) cls.move_state_updated_payout_method(order) return True, None @classmethod def update_invoice(cls, order, user, invoice, routing_budget_ppm): # Empty invoice? if not invoice: return False, {"bad_invoice": "You submitted an empty invoice"} # only the buyer can post a buyer invoice if not cls.is_buyer(order, user): return False, { "bad_request": "Only the buyer of this order can provide a buyer invoice." } if not order.taker_bond: return False, {"bad_request": "Wait for your order to be taken."} if ( not ( order.taker_bond.status == order.maker_bond.status == LNPayment.Status.LOCKED ) and not order.status == Order.Status.FAI ): return False, { "bad_request": "You cannot submit a invoice while bonds are not locked." } if order.status == Order.Status.FAI: if order.payout.status != LNPayment.Status.EXPIRE: return False, { "bad_request": "You cannot submit an invoice only after expiration or 3 failed attempts" } # cancel onchain_payout if existing cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order) num_satoshis = cls.payout_amount(order, user)[1]["invoice_amount"] routing_budget_sats = float(num_satoshis) * ( float(routing_budget_ppm) / 1_000_000 ) num_satoshis = int(num_satoshis - routing_budget_sats) payout = LNNode.validate_ln_invoice(invoice, num_satoshis, routing_budget_ppm) if not payout["valid"]: return False, payout["context"] order.payout, _ = LNPayment.objects.update_or_create( concept=LNPayment.Concepts.PAYBUYER, type=LNPayment.Types.NORM, sender=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME), order_paid_LN=order, # In case this user has other payouts, update the one related to this order. receiver=user, routing_budget_ppm=routing_budget_ppm, routing_budget_sats=routing_budget_sats, # if there is a LNPayment matching these above, it updates that one with defaults below. defaults={ "invoice": invoice, "status": LNPayment.Status.VALIDI, "num_satoshis": num_satoshis, "description": payout["description"], "payment_hash": payout["payment_hash"], "created_at": payout["created_at"], "expires_at": payout["expires_at"], }, ) order.is_swap = False order.save(update_fields=["payout", "is_swap"]) cls.move_state_updated_payout_method(order) return True, None @classmethod def move_state_updated_payout_method(cls, order): # If the order status is 'Waiting for invoice'. Move forward to 'chat' if order.status == Order.Status.WFI: order.status = Order.Status.CHA order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta( seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA) ) send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="fiat_exchange_starts") # If the order status is 'Waiting for both'. Move forward to 'waiting for escrow' elif order.status == Order.Status.WF2: # If the escrow does not exist, or is not locked move to WFE. if order.trade_escrow is None: order.status = Order.Status.WFE # If the escrow is locked move to Chat. elif order.trade_escrow.status == LNPayment.Status.LOCKED: order.status = Order.Status.CHA order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta( seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA) ) send_notification.delay( order_id=order.id, message="fiat_exchange_starts" ) else: order.status = Order.Status.WFE # If the order status is 'Failed Routing'. Retry payment. elif order.status == Order.Status.FAI: if LNNode.double_check_htlc_is_settled(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash): order.status = Order.Status.PAY order.payout.status = LNPayment.Status.FLIGHT order.payout.routing_attempts = 0 order.payout.save(update_fields=["status", "routing_attempts"]) order.save(update_fields=["status", "expires_at"]) return True def is_penalized(user): """Checks if a user that is not participant of orders has a limit on taking or making a order""" if user.robot.penalty_expiration: if user.robot.penalty_expiration > timezone.now(): time_out = (user.robot.penalty_expiration - timezone.now()).seconds return True, time_out return False, None @classmethod def cancel_order(cls, order, user, state=None): # Do not change order status if an is in order # any of these status do_not_cancel = [ Order.Status.UCA, Order.Status.EXP, Order.Status.TLD, Order.Status.DIS, Order.Status.CCA, Order.Status.PAY, Order.Status.SUC, Order.Status.FAI, Order.Status.MLD, ] if order.status in do_not_cancel: return False, {"bad_request": "You cannot cancel this order"} # 1) When maker cancels before bond # The order never shows up on the book and order # status becomes "cancelled" if order.status == Order.Status.WFB and order.maker == user: cls.cancel_bond(order.maker_bond) order.status = Order.Status.UCA order.save(update_fields=["status"]) return True, None # 2.a) When maker cancels after bond # # The order dissapears from book and goes to cancelled. If strict, maker is charged the bond # to prevent DDOS on the LN node and order book. If not strict, maker is returned # the bond (more user friendly). elif ( order.status in [Order.Status.PUB, Order.Status.PAU] and order.maker == user ): # Return the maker bond (Maker gets returned the bond for cancelling public order) if cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond): order.status = Order.Status.UCA order.save(update_fields=["status"]) send_notification.delay( order_id=order.id, message="public_order_cancelled" ) return True, None # 2.b) When maker cancels after bond and before taker bond is locked # # The order dissapears from book and goes to cancelled. # The bond maker bond is returned. elif order.status == Order.Status.TAK and order.maker == user: # Return the maker bond (Maker gets returned the bond for cancelling public order) if cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond): cls.cancel_bond(order.taker_bond) order.status = Order.Status.UCA order.save(update_fields=["status"]) send_notification.delay( order_id=order.id, message="public_order_cancelled" ) return True, None # 3) When taker cancels before bond # The order goes back to the book as public. # LNPayment "order.taker_bond" is deleted() elif order.status == Order.Status.TAK and order.taker == user: # adds a timeout penalty cls.cancel_bond(order.taker_bond) cls.kick_taker(order) return True, None # 4) When taker or maker cancel after bond (before escrow) # # The order goes into cancelled status if maker cancels. # The order goes into the public book if taker cancels. # In both cases there is a small fee. # 4.a) When maker cancel after bond (before escrow) # The order into cancelled status if maker cancels. elif ( order.status in [Order.Status.WF2, Order.Status.WFE] and order.maker == user ): # cancel onchain payment if existing cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order) # Settle the maker bond (Maker loses the bond for canceling an ongoing trade) valid = cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond) cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond) # returns taker bond if valid: order.status = Order.Status.UCA order.save(update_fields=["status"]) # Reward taker with part of the maker bond cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond) return True, None # 4.b) When taker cancel after bond (before escrow) # The order into cancelled status if mtker cancels. elif ( order.status in [Order.Status.WF2, Order.Status.WFE] and order.taker == user ): # cancel onchain payment if existing cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order) # Settle the maker bond (Maker loses the bond for canceling an ongoing trade) valid = cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond) if valid: taker_bond = order.taker_bond cls.publish_order(order) send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_published") # Reward maker with part of the taker bond cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, taker_bond, order.maker_bond) return True, None # 5) When trade collateral has been posted (after escrow) # # Always goes to CCA status. Collaboration is needed. # When a user asks for cancel, 'order.m/t/aker_asked_cancel' goes True. # When the second user asks for cancel. Order is totally cancelled. # Must have a small cost for both parties to prevent node DDOS. elif order.status in [Order.Status.WFI, Order.Status.CHA]: # if the maker had asked, and now the taker does: cancel order, return everything if order.maker_asked_cancel and user == order.taker: cls.collaborative_cancel(order) return True, None # if the taker had asked, and now the maker does: cancel order, return everything elif order.taker_asked_cancel and user == order.maker: cls.collaborative_cancel(order) return True, None # Otherwise just make true the asked for cancel flags elif user == order.taker: order.taker_asked_cancel = True order.save(update_fields=["taker_asked_cancel"]) return True, None elif user == order.maker: order.maker_asked_cancel = True order.save(update_fields=["maker_asked_cancel"]) return True, None else: return False, {"bad_request": "You cannot cancel this order"} @classmethod def collaborative_cancel(cls, order): if order.status not in [Order.Status.WFI, Order.Status.CHA]: return # cancel onchain payment if existing cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order) cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond) cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond) cls.return_escrow(order) order.status = Order.Status.CCA order.save(update_fields=["status"]) send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="collaborative_cancelled") return @classmethod def publish_order(cls, order): order.status = Order.Status.PUB order.expires_at = order.created_at + timedelta( seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.PUB) ) if order.has_range: order.amount = None order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order) order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now() # clear fields in case of re-publishing after expiry order.taker = None order.taker_bond = None order.trade_escrow = None order.payout = None order.payout_tx = None order.save() # update all fields # send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id,'order_published') # too spammy return def compute_cltv_expiry_blocks(order, invoice_concept): """Computes timelock CLTV expiry of the last hop in blocks for hodl invoices invoice_concepts (str): maker_bond, taker_bond, trade_escrow """ # Every invoice_concept must be locked by at least the fiat exchange duration # Every invoice must also be locked for deposit_time (order.escrow_duration or WFE status) cltv_expiry_secs = order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA) cltv_expiry_secs += order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WFE) # Maker bond must also be locked for the full public duration plus the taker bond locking time if invoice_concept == "maker_bond": cltv_expiry_secs += order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.PUB) cltv_expiry_secs += order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK) # Add a safety marging by multiplying by the maxium expected mining network speed up safe_cltv_expiry_secs = cltv_expiry_secs * MAX_MINING_NETWORK_SPEEDUP_EXPECTED # Convert to blocks using assummed average block time (~8 mins/block) cltv_expiry_blocks = int(safe_cltv_expiry_secs / (BLOCK_TIME * 60)) return cltv_expiry_blocks @classmethod def gen_maker_hold_invoice(cls, order, user): # Do not gen and cancel if order is older than expiry time if order.expires_at < timezone.now(): cls.order_expires(order) return False, { "bad_request": "Invoice expired. You did not confirm publishing the order in time. Make a new order." } # Return the previous invoice if there was one and is still unpaid if order.maker_bond: return True, { "bond_invoice": order.maker_bond.invoice, "bond_satoshis": order.maker_bond.num_satoshis, } # If there was no maker_bond object yet, generates one order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order) order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now() bond_satoshis = int(order.last_satoshis * order.bond_size / 100) if user.robot.wants_stealth: description = f"This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally. Payment reference: {order.reference}" else: description = f"RoboSats - Publishing '{str(order)}' - Maker bond - This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally." # Gen hold Invoice try: hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice( bond_satoshis, description, invoice_expiry=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WFB), cltv_expiry_blocks=cls.compute_cltv_expiry_blocks(order, "maker_bond"), ) except Exception as e: print(str(e)) if "failed to connect to all addresses" in str(e): return False, { "bad_request": "The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware." } elif "wallet locked" in str(e): return False, { "bad_request": "This is weird, RoboSats' lightning wallet is locked. Check in the Telegram group, maybe the staff has died." } order.maker_bond = LNPayment.objects.create( concept=LNPayment.Concepts.MAKEBOND, type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD, sender=user, receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME), invoice=hold_payment["invoice"], preimage=hold_payment["preimage"], status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN, num_satoshis=bond_satoshis, description=description, payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"], created_at=hold_payment["created_at"], expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"], cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"], ) order.save(update_fields=["last_satoshis", "last_satoshis_time", "maker_bond"]) return True, { "bond_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"], "bond_satoshis": bond_satoshis, } @classmethod def finalize_contract(cls, order): """When the taker locks the taker_bond the contract is final""" # THE TRADE AMOUNT IS FINAL WITH THE CONFIRMATION OF THE TAKER BOND! # (This is the last update to "last_satoshis", it becomes the escrow amount next) order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order) order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now() order.taker_bond.status = LNPayment.Status.LOCKED order.taker_bond.save(update_fields=["status"]) # With the bond confirmation the order is extended 'public_order_duration' hours order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta( seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WF2) ) order.status = Order.Status.WF2 order.save( update_fields=[ "last_satoshis", "last_satoshis_time", "expires_at", "status", ] ) # Both users robots are added one more contract // Unsafe can add more than once. order.maker.robot.total_contracts += 1 order.taker.robot.total_contracts += 1 order.maker.robot.save(update_fields=["total_contracts"]) order.taker.robot.save(update_fields=["total_contracts"]) # Log a market tick try: MarketTick.log_a_tick(order) except Exception: pass send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_taken_confirmed") return True @classmethod def gen_taker_hold_invoice(cls, order, user): # Do not gen and kick out the taker if order is older than expiry time if order.expires_at < timezone.now(): cls.order_expires(order) return False, { "bad_request": "Invoice expired. You did not confirm taking the order in time." } # Do not gen if a taker invoice exist. Do not return if it is already locked. Return the old one if still waiting. if order.taker_bond: return True, { "bond_invoice": order.taker_bond.invoice, "bond_satoshis": order.taker_bond.num_satoshis, } # If there was no taker_bond object yet, generates one order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order) order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now() bond_satoshis = int(order.last_satoshis * order.bond_size / 100) pos_text = "Buying" if cls.is_buyer(order, user) else "Selling" if user.robot.wants_stealth: description = f"This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally. Payment reference: {order.reference}" else: description = ( f"RoboSats - Taking 'Order {order.id}' {pos_text} BTC for {str(float(order.amount)) + Currency.currency_dict[str(order.currency.currency)]}" + " - Taker bond - This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally." ) # Gen hold Invoice try: hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice( bond_satoshis, description, invoice_expiry=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK), cltv_expiry_blocks=cls.compute_cltv_expiry_blocks(order, "taker_bond"), ) except Exception as e: if "status = StatusCode.UNAVAILABLE" in str(e): return False, { "bad_request": "The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware." } order.taker_bond = LNPayment.objects.create( concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TAKEBOND, type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD, sender=user, receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME), invoice=hold_payment["invoice"], preimage=hold_payment["preimage"], status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN, num_satoshis=bond_satoshis, description=description, payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"], created_at=hold_payment["created_at"], expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"], cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"], ) order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta( seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK) ) order.save( update_fields=[ "expires_at", "last_satoshis_time", "taker_bond", "expires_at", ] ) return True, { "bond_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"], "bond_satoshis": bond_satoshis, } def trade_escrow_received(order): """Moves the order forward""" # If status is 'Waiting for both' move to Waiting for invoice if order.status == Order.Status.WF2: order.status = Order.Status.WFI order.save(update_fields=["status"]) # If status is 'Waiting for invoice' move to Chat elif order.status == Order.Status.WFE: order.status = Order.Status.CHA order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta( seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA) ) order.save(update_fields=["status", "expires_at"]) send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="fiat_exchange_starts") @classmethod def gen_escrow_hold_invoice(cls, order, user): # Do not generate if escrow deposit time has expired if order.expires_at < timezone.now(): cls.order_expires(order) return False, { "bad_request": "Invoice expired. You did not send the escrow in time." } # Do not gen if an escrow invoice exist. Do not return if it is already locked. Return the old one if still waiting. if order.trade_escrow: return True, { "escrow_invoice": order.trade_escrow.invoice, "escrow_satoshis": order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis, } # If there was no taker_bond object yet, generate one escrow_satoshis = cls.escrow_amount(order, user)[1][ "escrow_amount" ] # Amount was fixed when taker bond was locked, fee applied here if user.robot.wants_stealth: description = f"This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally. Payment reference: {order.reference}" else: description = f"RoboSats - Escrow amount for '{str(order)}' - It WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET. It will be released to the buyer once you confirm you received the fiat. It will automatically return if buyer does not confirm the payment." # Gen hold Invoice try: hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice( escrow_satoshis, description, invoice_expiry=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WF2), cltv_expiry_blocks=cls.compute_cltv_expiry_blocks( order, "trade_escrow" ), ) except Exception as e: if "status = StatusCode.UNAVAILABLE" in str(e): return False, { "bad_request": "The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware." } order.trade_escrow = LNPayment.objects.create( concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TRESCROW, type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD, sender=user, receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME), invoice=hold_payment["invoice"], preimage=hold_payment["preimage"], status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN, num_satoshis=escrow_satoshis, description=description, payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"], created_at=hold_payment["created_at"], expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"], cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"], ) order.save(update_fields=["trade_escrow"]) return True, { "escrow_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"], "escrow_satoshis": escrow_satoshis, } def settle_escrow(order): """Settles the trade escrow hold invoice""" if LNNode.settle_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.preimage): order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"]) return True def settle_bond(bond): """Settles the bond hold invoice""" if LNNode.settle_hold_invoice(bond.preimage): bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED bond.save(update_fields=["status"]) return True def return_escrow(order): """returns the trade escrow""" if LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash): order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.RETNED order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"]) return True def cancel_escrow(order): """returns the trade escrow""" # Same as return escrow, but used when the invoice was never LOCKED if LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash): order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.CANCEL order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"]) return True def return_bond(bond): """returns a bond""" if bond is None: return try: LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(bond.payment_hash) bond.status = LNPayment.Status.RETNED bond.save(update_fields=["status"]) return True except Exception as e: if "invoice already settled" in str(e): bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED bond.save(update_fields=["status"]) return True else: raise e def cancel_onchain_payment(order): """Cancel onchain_payment if existing""" if order.payout_tx: order.payout_tx.status = OnchainPayment.Status.CANCE order.payout_tx.save(update_fields=["status"]) return True else: return False def cancel_bond(bond): """cancel a bond""" # Same as return bond, but used when the invoice was never LOCKED if bond is None: return True try: LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(bond.payment_hash) bond.status = LNPayment.Status.CANCEL bond.save(update_fields=["status"]) return True except Exception as e: if "invoice already settled" in str(e): bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED bond.save(update_fields=["status"]) return True else: raise e @classmethod def pay_buyer(cls, order): """Pays buyer invoice or onchain address""" # Pay to buyer invoice if not order.is_swap: # Background process "follow_invoices" will try to pay this invoice until success order.payout.status = LNPayment.Status.FLIGHT order.payout.save(update_fields=["status"]) order.status = Order.Status.PAY order.contract_finalization_time = timezone.now() order.save(update_fields=["status", "contract_finalization_time"]) send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="trade_successful") return True # Pay onchain to address else: if not order.payout_tx.status == OnchainPayment.Status.VALID: return False else: # Add onchain payment to queue order.payout_tx.status = OnchainPayment.Status.QUEUE order.payout_tx.save(update_fields=["status"]) order.status = Order.Status.SUC order.contract_finalization_time = timezone.now() order.save(update_fields=["status", "contract_finalization_time"]) send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="trade_successful") return True @classmethod def confirm_fiat(cls, order, user): """If Order is in the CHAT states: If user is buyer: fiat_sent goes to true. If User is seller and fiat_sent is true: settle the escrow and pay buyer invoice!""" if order.status == Order.Status.CHA or order.status == Order.Status.FSE: # If buyer, settle escrow and mark fiat sent if cls.is_buyer(order, user): order.status = Order.Status.FSE order.is_fiat_sent = True order.save(update_fields=["status", "is_fiat_sent"]) # If seller and fiat was sent, SETTLE ESCROW AND PAY BUYER INVOICE elif cls.is_seller(order, user): if not order.is_fiat_sent: return False, { "bad_request": "You cannot confirm to have received the fiat before it is confirmed to be sent by the buyer." } # Make sure the trade escrow is at least as big as the buyer invoice num_satoshis = ( order.payout_tx.num_satoshis if order.is_swap else order.payout.num_satoshis ) if order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis <= num_satoshis: return False, { "bad_request": "Woah, something broke badly. Report in the public channels, or open a Github Issue." } # !!! KEY LINE - SETTLES THE TRADE ESCROW !!! if cls.settle_escrow(order): order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"]) # Double check the escrow is settled. if LNNode.double_check_htlc_is_settled(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash): # RETURN THE BONDS cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond) cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond) # !!! KEY LINE - PAYS THE BUYER INVOICE !!! cls.pay_buyer(order) # Computes coordinator trade revenue cls.compute_proceeds(order) return True, None else: return False, { "bad_request": "You cannot confirm the fiat payment at this stage" } return True, None @classmethod def undo_confirm_fiat_sent(cls, order, user): """If Order is in the CHAT states: If user is buyer: fiat_sent goes to true. """ if not cls.is_buyer(order, user): return False, { "bad_request": "Only the buyer can undo the fiat sent confirmation." } if order.status != Order.Status.FSE: return False, { "bad_request": "Only orders in Chat and with fiat sent confirmed can be reverted." } order.status = Order.Status.CHA order.is_fiat_sent = False order.reverted_fiat_sent = True order.save(update_fields=["status", "is_fiat_sent", "reverted_fiat_sent"]) return True, None def pause_unpause_public_order(order, user): if not order.maker == user: return False, { "bad_request": "You cannot pause or unpause an order you did not make" } else: if order.status == Order.Status.PUB: order.status = Order.Status.PAU elif order.status == Order.Status.PAU: order.status = Order.Status.PUB else: return False, { "bad_request": "You can only pause/unpause an order that is either public or paused" } order.save(update_fields=["status"]) return True, None @classmethod def rate_platform(cls, user, rating): user.robot.platform_rating = rating user.robot.save(update_fields=["platform_rating"]) return True, None @classmethod def add_slashed_rewards(cls, order, slashed_bond, staked_bond): """ When a bond is slashed due to overtime, rewards the user that was waiting. slashed_bond is the bond settled by the robot who forfeits his bond. staked_bond is the bond that was at stake by the robot who is rewarded. It may happen that the Sats at stake by the maker are larger than the Sats at stake by the taker (range amount orders where the taker does not take the maximum available). In those cases, the change is added back also to the robot that was slashed (discounted by the forfeited amount). """ reward_fraction = config("SLASHED_BOND_REWARD_SPLIT", cast=float, default=0.5) if staked_bond.num_satoshis < slashed_bond.num_satoshis: slashed_satoshis = min(slashed_bond.num_satoshis, staked_bond.num_satoshis) slashed_return = int(slashed_bond.num_satoshis - slashed_satoshis) else: slashed_satoshis = slashed_bond.num_satoshis slashed_return = 0 reward = int(slashed_satoshis * reward_fraction) rewarded_robot = staked_bond.sender.robot rewarded_robot.earned_rewards += reward rewarded_robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"]) if slashed_return > 100: slashed_robot = slashed_bond.sender.robot slashed_robot.earned_rewards += slashed_return slashed_robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"]) proceeds = int(slashed_satoshis * (1 - reward_fraction)) order.proceeds += proceeds order.save(update_fields=["proceeds"]) return @classmethod def withdraw_rewards(cls, user, invoice): # only a user with positive withdraw balance can use this if user.robot.earned_rewards < 1: return False, {"bad_invoice": "You have not earned rewards"} num_satoshis = user.robot.earned_rewards routing_budget_sats = int( max( num_satoshis * float(config("PROPORTIONAL_ROUTING_FEE_LIMIT")), float(config("MIN_FLAT_ROUTING_FEE_LIMIT_REWARD")), ) ) # 1000 ppm or 10 sats routing_budget_ppm = (routing_budget_sats / float(num_satoshis)) * 1_000_000 reward_payout = LNNode.validate_ln_invoice( invoice, num_satoshis, routing_budget_ppm ) if not reward_payout["valid"]: return False, reward_payout["context"] try: lnpayment = LNPayment.objects.create( concept=LNPayment.Concepts.WITHREWA, type=LNPayment.Types.NORM, sender=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME), status=LNPayment.Status.VALIDI, receiver=user, invoice=invoice, num_satoshis=num_satoshis, description=reward_payout["description"], payment_hash=reward_payout["payment_hash"], created_at=reward_payout["created_at"], expires_at=reward_payout["expires_at"], ) # Might fail if payment_hash already exists in DB except Exception: return False, {"bad_invoice": "Give me a new invoice"} user.robot.earned_rewards = 0 user.robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"]) # Pays the invoice. paid, failure_reason = LNNode.pay_invoice(lnpayment) if paid: user.robot.earned_rewards = 0 user.robot.claimed_rewards += num_satoshis user.robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards", "claimed_rewards"]) return True, None # If fails, adds the rewards again. else: user.robot.earned_rewards = num_satoshis user.robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"]) context = {} context["bad_invoice"] = failure_reason return False, context @classmethod def compute_proceeds(cls, order): """ Computes Coordinator trade proceeds for finished orders. """ if order.is_swap: payout_sats = order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis + order.payout_tx.mining_fee order.proceeds += int(order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - payout_sats) else: payout_sats = order.payout.num_satoshis + order.payout.fee order.proceeds += int(order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - payout_sats) order.save(update_fields=["proceeds"]) @classmethod def summarize_trade(cls, order, user): """ Summarizes a finished order. Returns a dict with amounts, fees, costs, etc, for buyer and seller. """ if order.status not in [Order.Status.SUC, Order.Status.PAY, Order.Status.FAI]: return False, {"bad_summary": "Order has not finished yet"} context = {} users = {"taker": order.taker, "maker": order.maker} for order_user in users: summary = {} summary["trade_fee_percent"] = ( FEE * MAKER_FEE_SPLIT if order_user == "maker" else FEE * (1 - MAKER_FEE_SPLIT) ) summary["bond_size_sats"] = ( order.maker_bond.num_satoshis if order_user == "maker" else order.taker_bond.num_satoshis ) summary["bond_size_percent"] = order.bond_size summary["is_buyer"] = cls.is_buyer(order, users[order_user]) if summary["is_buyer"]: summary["sent_fiat"] = order.amount if order.is_swap: summary["received_sats"] = order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis else: summary["received_sats"] = order.payout.num_satoshis summary["payment_hash"] = order.payout.payment_hash summary["preimage"] = order.payout.preimage summary["trade_fee_sats"] = round( order.last_satoshis - summary["received_sats"] - (order.payout.routing_budget_sats if not order.is_swap else 0) ) # Only add context for swap costs if the user is the swap recipient. Peer should not know whether it was a swap if users[order_user] == user and order.is_swap: summary["is_swap"] = order.is_swap summary["received_onchain_sats"] = order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis summary["address"] = order.payout_tx.address summary["txid"] = order.payout_tx.txid summary["mining_fee_sats"] = order.payout_tx.mining_fee_sats summary["swap_fee_sats"] = round( order.payout_tx.num_satoshis - order.payout_tx.mining_fee_sats - order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis ) summary["swap_fee_percent"] = order.payout_tx.swap_fee_rate summary["trade_fee_sats"] = round( order.last_satoshis - summary["received_sats"] - summary["mining_fee_sats"] - summary["swap_fee_sats"] ) else: summary["sent_sats"] = order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis summary["received_fiat"] = order.amount summary["trade_fee_sats"] = round( summary["sent_sats"] - order.last_satoshis ) context[f"{order_user}_summary"] = summary platform_summary = {} platform_summary["contract_exchange_rate"] = float(order.amount) / ( float(order.last_satoshis) / 100_000_000 ) if order.last_satoshis_time is not None: platform_summary["contract_timestamp"] = order.last_satoshis_time if order.contract_finalization_time is None: order.contract_finalization_time = timezone.now() order.save(update_fields=["contract_finalization_time"]) platform_summary["contract_total_time"] = ( order.contract_finalization_time - order.last_satoshis_time ) if not order.is_swap: platform_summary["routing_budget_sats"] = order.payout.routing_budget_sats platform_summary["trade_revenue_sats"] = int( order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - order.payout.num_satoshis ) else: platform_summary["routing_fee_sats"] = 0 platform_summary["trade_revenue_sats"] = int( order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - order.payout_tx.num_satoshis ) context["platform_summary"] = platform_summary return True, context