mirror of
https://github.com/RoboSats/robosats.git
synced 2024-12-13 19:06:26 +00:00
5ff70bccb7
* Add CLN node backend image and service (#418) * Add cln service * Add hodlvoice Dockerfile and entrypoint * Add lnnode vendor switch (#431) * Add LNNode vendor switch * Add CLN version to frontend and other fixes * init * first draft * add unsettled_local_balance and unsettled_remote_balance * gen_hold_invoice now takes 3 more variables to build a label for cln * remove unneeded payment_hash from gen_hold_invoice * remove comment * add get_cln_version * first draft of clns follow_send_payment * fix name of get_lnd_version * enable flake8 * flake8 fixes * renaming cln file, class and get_version * remove lnd specific commented code * get_version: add try/except, refactor to top to mimic lnd.py * rename htlc_cltv to htlc_expiry * add clns lookup_invoice_status * refactored double_check_htlc_is_settled to the end to match lnds file * fix generate_rpc * Add sample environmental variables, small fixes * Fix CLN gRPC port * Fix gen_hold_invoice, plus some other tiny fixes (#435) * Fix channel_balance to use int object inside Amount (#438) * Add CLN/LND volume to celery-beat service * Add CLN/LND volume to celery-beat service * Bump CLN to v23.05 * changes for 0.5 and some small fixes * change invoice expiry from absolute to relative duration * add try/except to catch timeout error * fix failure_reason to be ln_payment failure reasons, albeit inaccurate sometimes * refactor follow_send_payment and add pending check to expired case * fix status comments * add send_keysend method * fix wrong state ints in cancel and settle * switch to use hodlinvoicelookup in double_check * move pay command after lnpayment status update * remove loop in follow_send_payment and add error result for edge case * fix typeerror for payment_hash * rework follow_send_payment logic and payment_hash, watch harder if pending * use fully qualified names for status instead of raw int * missed 2 status from prev commit * Always copy the cln-grpc-hodl plugin on start up * Fix ALLOW_SELF_KEYSEND linting error * Fix missing definition of failure_reason --------- Co-authored-by: daywalker90 <admin@noserver4u.de>
1764 lines
70 KiB
Python
1764 lines
70 KiB
Python
import math
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from datetime import timedelta
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from decouple import config
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from django.contrib.auth.models import User
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from django.db.models import Q, Sum
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from django.utils import timezone
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from api.lightning.node import LNNode
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from api.models import Currency, LNPayment, MarketTick, OnchainPayment, Order
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from api.tasks import send_devfund_donation, send_notification
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from api.utils import validate_onchain_address
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from chat.models import Message
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FEE = float(config("FEE"))
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MAKER_FEE_SPLIT = float(config("MAKER_FEE_SPLIT"))
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ESCROW_USERNAME = config("ESCROW_USERNAME")
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PENALTY_TIMEOUT = int(config("PENALTY_TIMEOUT"))
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MIN_TRADE = int(config("MIN_TRADE"))
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MAX_TRADE = int(config("MAX_TRADE"))
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EXP_MAKER_BOND_INVOICE = int(config("EXP_MAKER_BOND_INVOICE"))
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EXP_TAKER_BOND_INVOICE = int(config("EXP_TAKER_BOND_INVOICE"))
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BLOCK_TIME = float(config("BLOCK_TIME"))
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MAX_MINING_NETWORK_SPEEDUP_EXPECTED = float(
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config("MAX_MINING_NETWORK_SPEEDUP_EXPECTED")
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)
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INVOICE_AND_ESCROW_DURATION = int(config("INVOICE_AND_ESCROW_DURATION"))
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FIAT_EXCHANGE_DURATION = int(config("FIAT_EXCHANGE_DURATION"))
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class Logics:
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@classmethod
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def validate_already_maker_or_taker(cls, user):
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"""Validates if a use is already not part of an active order"""
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active_order_status = [
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Order.Status.WFB,
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Order.Status.PUB,
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Order.Status.PAU,
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Order.Status.TAK,
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Order.Status.WF2,
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Order.Status.WFE,
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Order.Status.WFI,
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Order.Status.CHA,
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Order.Status.FSE,
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Order.Status.DIS,
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Order.Status.WFR,
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]
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"""Checks if the user is already partipant of an active order"""
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queryset = Order.objects.filter(maker=user, status__in=active_order_status)
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if queryset.exists():
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return (
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False,
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{"bad_request": "You are already maker of an active order"},
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queryset[0],
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)
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queryset = Order.objects.filter(taker=user, status__in=active_order_status)
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if queryset.exists():
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return (
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False,
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{"bad_request": "You are already taker of an active order"},
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queryset[0],
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)
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# Edge case when the user is in an order that is failing payment and he is the buyer
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queryset = Order.objects.filter(
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Q(maker=user) | Q(taker=user),
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status__in=[Order.Status.FAI, Order.Status.PAY],
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)
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if queryset.exists():
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order = queryset[0]
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if cls.is_buyer(order, user):
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return (
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False,
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{
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"bad_request": "You are still pending a payment from a recent order"
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},
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order,
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)
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return True, None, None
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@classmethod
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def validate_order_size(cls, order):
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"""Validates if order size in Sats is within limits at t0"""
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if not order.has_range:
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if order.t0_satoshis > MAX_TRADE:
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return False, {
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"bad_request": "Your order is too big. It is worth "
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+ "{:,}".format(order.t0_satoshis)
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+ " Sats now, but the limit is "
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+ "{:,}".format(MAX_TRADE)
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+ " Sats"
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}
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if order.t0_satoshis < MIN_TRADE:
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return False, {
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"bad_request": "Your order is too small. It is worth "
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+ "{:,}".format(order.t0_satoshis)
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+ " Sats now, but the limit is "
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+ "{:,}".format(MIN_TRADE)
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+ " Sats"
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}
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elif order.has_range:
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min_sats = cls.calc_sats(
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order.min_amount, order.currency.exchange_rate, order.premium
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)
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max_sats = cls.calc_sats(
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order.max_amount, order.currency.exchange_rate, order.premium
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)
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if min_sats > max_sats / 1.5:
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return False, {
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"bad_request": "Maximum range amount must be at least 50 percent higher than the minimum amount"
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}
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elif max_sats > MAX_TRADE:
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return False, {
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"bad_request": "Your order maximum amount is too big. It is worth "
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+ "{:,}".format(int(max_sats))
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+ " Sats now, but the limit is "
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+ "{:,}".format(MAX_TRADE)
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+ " Sats"
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}
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elif min_sats < MIN_TRADE:
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return False, {
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"bad_request": "Your order minimum amount is too small. It is worth "
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+ "{:,}".format(int(min_sats))
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+ " Sats now, but the limit is "
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+ "{:,}".format(MIN_TRADE)
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+ " Sats"
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}
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elif min_sats < max_sats / 15:
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return False, {
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"bad_request": "Your order amount range is too large. Max amount can only be 15 times bigger than min amount"
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}
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return True, None
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def validate_amount_within_range(order, amount):
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if amount > float(order.max_amount) or amount < float(order.min_amount):
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return False, {
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"bad_request": "The amount specified is outside the range specified by the maker"
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}
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return True, None
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def user_activity_status(last_seen):
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if last_seen > (timezone.now() - timedelta(minutes=2)):
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return "Active"
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elif last_seen > (timezone.now() - timedelta(minutes=10)):
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return "Seen recently"
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else:
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return "Inactive"
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@classmethod
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def take(cls, order, user, amount=None):
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is_penalized, time_out = cls.is_penalized(user)
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if is_penalized:
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return False, {
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"bad_request",
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f"You need to wait {time_out} seconds to take an order",
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}
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else:
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if order.has_range:
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order.amount = amount
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order.taker = user
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order.status = Order.Status.TAK
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order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
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seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK)
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)
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order.save(update_fields=["amount", "taker", "status", "expires_at"])
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return True, None
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def is_buyer(order, user):
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is_maker = order.maker == user
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is_taker = order.taker == user
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return (is_maker and order.type == Order.Types.BUY) or (
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is_taker and order.type == Order.Types.SELL
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)
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def is_seller(order, user):
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is_maker = order.maker == user
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is_taker = order.taker == user
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return (is_maker and order.type == Order.Types.SELL) or (
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is_taker and order.type == Order.Types.BUY
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)
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def calc_sats(amount, exchange_rate, premium):
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exchange_rate = float(exchange_rate)
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premium_rate = exchange_rate * (1 + float(premium) / 100)
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return (float(amount) / premium_rate) * 100 * 1000 * 1000
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@classmethod
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def satoshis_now(cls, order):
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"""checks trade amount in sats"""
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if order.is_explicit:
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satoshis_now = order.satoshis
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else:
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amount = order.amount if order.amount is not None else order.max_amount
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satoshis_now = cls.calc_sats(
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amount, order.currency.exchange_rate, order.premium
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)
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return int(satoshis_now)
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def price_and_premium_now(order):
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"""computes order price and premium with current rates"""
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exchange_rate = float(order.currency.exchange_rate)
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if not order.is_explicit:
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premium = order.premium
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price = exchange_rate * (1 + float(premium) / 100)
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else:
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amount = order.amount if not order.has_range else order.max_amount
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order_rate = float(amount) / (float(order.satoshis) / 100_000_000)
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premium = order_rate / exchange_rate - 1
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premium = int(premium * 10_000) / 100 # 2 decimals left
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price = order_rate
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significant_digits = 5
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price = round(
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price, significant_digits - int(math.floor(math.log10(abs(price)))) - 1
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)
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return price, premium
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@classmethod
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def order_expires(cls, order):
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"""General cases when time runs out."""
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# Do not change order status if an order in any with
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# any of these status is sent to expire here
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does_not_expire = [
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Order.Status.UCA,
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Order.Status.EXP,
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Order.Status.TLD,
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Order.Status.DIS,
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Order.Status.CCA,
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Order.Status.PAY,
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Order.Status.SUC,
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Order.Status.FAI,
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Order.Status.MLD,
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]
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# in any case, if order is_swap and there is an onchain_payment, cancel it.
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if order.status not in does_not_expire:
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cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order)
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if order.status in does_not_expire:
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return False
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elif order.status == Order.Status.WFB:
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order.status = Order.Status.EXP
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order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NMBOND
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cls.cancel_bond(order.maker_bond)
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order.save(update_fields=["status", "expiry_reason"])
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return True
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elif order.status in [Order.Status.PUB, Order.Status.PAU]:
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cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond)
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order.status = Order.Status.EXP
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order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NTAKEN
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order.save(update_fields=["status", "expiry_reason"])
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send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_expired_untaken")
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return True
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elif order.status == Order.Status.TAK:
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cls.cancel_bond(order.taker_bond)
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cls.kick_taker(order)
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return True
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elif order.status == Order.Status.WF2:
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"""Weird case where an order expires and both participants
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did not proceed with the contract. Likely the site was
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down or there was a bug. Still bonds must be charged
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to avoid service DDOS."""
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cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
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cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
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cls.cancel_escrow(order)
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order.status = Order.Status.EXP
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order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NESINV
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order.save(update_fields=["status", "expiry_reason"])
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return True
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elif order.status == Order.Status.WFE:
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maker_is_seller = cls.is_seller(order, order.maker)
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# If maker is seller, settle the bond and order goes to expired
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if maker_is_seller:
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cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
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cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
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# If seller is offline the escrow LNpayment does not exist
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try:
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cls.cancel_escrow(order)
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except Exception:
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pass
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order.status = Order.Status.EXP
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order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NESCRO
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order.save(update_fields=["status", "expiry_reason"])
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# Reward taker with part of the maker bond
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cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond)
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return True
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# If maker is buyer, settle the taker's bond order goes back to public
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else:
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cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
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# If seller is offline the escrow LNpayment does not even exist
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try:
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cls.cancel_escrow(order)
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except Exception:
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pass
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taker_bond = order.taker_bond
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cls.publish_order(order)
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send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_published")
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# Reward maker with part of the taker bond
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cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, taker_bond, order.maker_bond)
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return True
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elif order.status == Order.Status.WFI:
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# The trade could happen without a buyer invoice. However, this user
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# is likely AFK; will probably desert the contract as well.
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maker_is_buyer = cls.is_buyer(order, order.maker)
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# If maker is buyer, settle the bond and order goes to expired
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if maker_is_buyer:
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cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
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cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
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cls.return_escrow(order)
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order.status = Order.Status.EXP
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order.expiry_reason = Order.ExpiryReasons.NINVOI
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order.save(update_fields=["status", "expiry_reason"])
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# Reward taker with part of the maker bond
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cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond)
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return True
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# If maker is seller settle the taker's bond, order goes back to public
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else:
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cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
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cls.return_escrow(order)
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taker_bond = order.taker_bond
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cls.publish_order(order)
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send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_published")
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# Reward maker with part of the taker bond
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cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, taker_bond, order.maker_bond)
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return True
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elif order.status in [Order.Status.CHA, Order.Status.FSE]:
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# Another weird case. The time to confirm 'fiat sent or received' expired. Yet no dispute
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# was opened. Hint: a seller-scammer could persuade a buyer to not click "fiat
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# sent", we assume this is a dispute case by default.
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cls.open_dispute(order)
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return True
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@classmethod
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def kick_taker(cls, order):
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"""The taker did not lock the taker_bond. Now he has to go"""
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# Add a time out to the taker
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if order.taker:
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robot = order.taker.robot
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robot.penalty_expiration = timezone.now() + timedelta(
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seconds=PENALTY_TIMEOUT
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)
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robot.save(update_fields=["penalty_expiration"])
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# Make order public again
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cls.publish_order(order)
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return True
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@classmethod
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def automatic_dispute_resolution(cls, order):
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"""Simple case where a dispute can be solved with a
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priori knowledge. For example, a dispute that opens
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at expiration on an order where one of the participants
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never sent a message on the chat and never marked 'fiat
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sent'. By solving the dispute automatically before
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flagging it as dispute, we avoid having to settle the
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bonds"""
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# If fiat has been marked as sent, automatic dispute
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# resolution is not possible.
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if order.is_fiat_sent and not order.reverted_fiat_sent:
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return False
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# If the order has not entered dispute due to time expire
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# (a user triggered it), automatic dispute resolution is
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# not possible.
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if order.expires_at >= timezone.now():
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return False
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num_messages_taker = len(
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Message.objects.filter(order=order, sender=order.taker)
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)
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num_messages_maker = len(
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Message.objects.filter(order=order, sender=order.maker)
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)
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if num_messages_maker == num_messages_taker == 0:
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cls.return_escrow(order)
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cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
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cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
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order.status = Order.Status.DIS
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elif num_messages_maker == 0:
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cls.return_escrow(order)
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cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
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cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
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cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond)
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order.status = Order.Status.MLD
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elif num_messages_taker == 0:
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cls.return_escrow(order)
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cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
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cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond)
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cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.taker_bond, order.maker_bond)
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order.status = Order.Status.TLD
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else:
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return False
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|
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order.is_disputed = True
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order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
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seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.DIS)
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)
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order.save(update_fields=["status", "is_disputed", "expires_at"])
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send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="dispute_opened")
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return True
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|
|
@classmethod
|
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def open_dispute(cls, order, user=None):
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|
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# Always settle escrow and bonds during a dispute. Disputes
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# can take long to resolve, it might trigger force closure
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# for unresolved HTLCs) Dispute winner will have to submit a
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# new invoice for value of escrow + bond.
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|
|
valid_status_open_dispute = [
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Order.Status.CHA,
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Order.Status.FSE,
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]
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|
|
if order.status not in valid_status_open_dispute:
|
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return False, {
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"bad_request": "You cannot open a dispute of this order at this stage"
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}
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|
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automatically_solved = cls.automatic_dispute_resolution(order)
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|
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if automatically_solved:
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
if not order.trade_escrow.status == LNPayment.Status.SETLED:
|
|
cls.settle_escrow(order)
|
|
cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
|
|
cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
|
|
|
|
order.is_disputed = True
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.DIS
|
|
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
|
|
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.DIS)
|
|
)
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["is_disputed", "status", "expires_at"])
|
|
|
|
# User could be None if a dispute is open automatically due to weird expiration.
|
|
if user is not None:
|
|
robot = user.robot
|
|
robot.num_disputes = robot.num_disputes + 1
|
|
if robot.orders_disputes_started is None:
|
|
robot.orders_disputes_started = [str(order.id)]
|
|
else:
|
|
robot.orders_disputes_started = list(
|
|
robot.orders_disputes_started
|
|
).append(str(order.id))
|
|
robot.save(update_fields=["num_disputes", "orders_disputes_started"])
|
|
|
|
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="dispute_opened")
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
def dispute_statement(order, user, statement):
|
|
"""Updates the dispute statements"""
|
|
|
|
if not order.status == Order.Status.DIS:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "Only orders in dispute accept dispute statements"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(statement) > 50_000:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_statement": "The statement and chat logs are longer than 50,000 characters"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(statement) < 100:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_statement": "The statement is too short. Make sure to be thorough."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if order.maker == user:
|
|
order.maker_statement = statement
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["maker_statement"])
|
|
else:
|
|
order.taker_statement = statement
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["taker_statement"])
|
|
|
|
# If both statements are in, move status to wait for dispute resolution
|
|
if order.maker_statement not in [None, ""] and order.taker_statement not in [
|
|
None,
|
|
"",
|
|
]:
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.WFR
|
|
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
|
|
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WFR)
|
|
)
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status", "expires_at"])
|
|
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
def compute_swap_fee_rate(balance):
|
|
|
|
shape = str(config("SWAP_FEE_SHAPE"))
|
|
|
|
if shape == "linear":
|
|
MIN_SWAP_FEE = float(config("MIN_SWAP_FEE"))
|
|
MIN_POINT = float(config("MIN_POINT"))
|
|
MAX_SWAP_FEE = float(config("MAX_SWAP_FEE"))
|
|
MAX_POINT = float(config("MAX_POINT"))
|
|
if float(balance.onchain_fraction) > MIN_POINT:
|
|
swap_fee_rate = MIN_SWAP_FEE
|
|
else:
|
|
slope = (MAX_SWAP_FEE - MIN_SWAP_FEE) / (MAX_POINT - MIN_POINT)
|
|
swap_fee_rate = (
|
|
slope * (balance.onchain_fraction - MAX_POINT) + MAX_SWAP_FEE
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
elif shape == "exponential":
|
|
MIN_SWAP_FEE = float(config("MIN_SWAP_FEE"))
|
|
MAX_SWAP_FEE = float(config("MAX_SWAP_FEE"))
|
|
SWAP_LAMBDA = float(config("SWAP_LAMBDA"))
|
|
swap_fee_rate = MIN_SWAP_FEE + (MAX_SWAP_FEE - MIN_SWAP_FEE) * math.exp(
|
|
-SWAP_LAMBDA * float(balance.onchain_fraction)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return swap_fee_rate * 100
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def create_onchain_payment(cls, order, user, preliminary_amount):
|
|
"""
|
|
Creates an empty OnchainPayment for order.payout_tx.
|
|
It sets the fees to be applied to this order if onchain Swap is used.
|
|
If the user submits a LN invoice instead. The returned OnchainPayment goes unused.
|
|
"""
|
|
# Make sure no invoice payout is attached to order
|
|
order.payout = None
|
|
|
|
# Create onchain_payment
|
|
onchain_payment = OnchainPayment.objects.create(receiver=user)
|
|
|
|
# Compute a safer available onchain liquidity: (confirmed_utxos - reserve - pending_outgoing_txs))
|
|
# Accounts for already committed outgoing TX for previous users.
|
|
confirmed = onchain_payment.balance.onchain_confirmed
|
|
# We assume a reserve of 300K Sats (3 times higher than LND's default anchor reserve)
|
|
reserve = 300_000
|
|
pending_txs = OnchainPayment.objects.filter(
|
|
status__in=[OnchainPayment.Status.VALID, OnchainPayment.Status.QUEUE]
|
|
).aggregate(Sum("num_satoshis"))["num_satoshis__sum"]
|
|
|
|
if pending_txs is None:
|
|
pending_txs = 0
|
|
|
|
available_onchain = confirmed - reserve - pending_txs
|
|
if (
|
|
preliminary_amount > available_onchain
|
|
): # Not enough onchain balance to commit for this swap.
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
suggested_mining_fee_rate = LNNode.estimate_fee(
|
|
amount_sats=preliminary_amount,
|
|
target_conf=config("SUGGESTED_TARGET_CONF", cast=int, default=2),
|
|
)["mining_fee_rate"]
|
|
|
|
# Hardcap mining fee suggested at 1000 sats/vbyte
|
|
if suggested_mining_fee_rate > 1000:
|
|
suggested_mining_fee_rate = 1000
|
|
|
|
onchain_payment.suggested_mining_fee_rate = max(2.05, suggested_mining_fee_rate)
|
|
onchain_payment.swap_fee_rate = cls.compute_swap_fee_rate(
|
|
onchain_payment.balance
|
|
)
|
|
onchain_payment.save()
|
|
|
|
order.payout_tx = onchain_payment
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["payout_tx"])
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def payout_amount(cls, order, user):
|
|
"""Computes buyer invoice amount. Uses order.last_satoshis,
|
|
that is the final trade amount set at Taker Bond time
|
|
Adds context for onchain swap.
|
|
"""
|
|
if not cls.is_buyer(order, user):
|
|
return False, None
|
|
|
|
if user == order.maker:
|
|
fee_fraction = FEE * MAKER_FEE_SPLIT
|
|
elif user == order.taker:
|
|
fee_fraction = FEE * (1 - MAKER_FEE_SPLIT)
|
|
|
|
fee_sats = order.last_satoshis * fee_fraction
|
|
|
|
context = {}
|
|
# context necessary for the user to submit a LN invoice
|
|
context["invoice_amount"] = round(
|
|
order.last_satoshis - fee_sats
|
|
) # Trading fee to buyer is charged here.
|
|
|
|
# context necessary for the user to submit an onchain address
|
|
MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT = config("MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT", cast=int, default=20_000)
|
|
MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT = config("MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT", cast=int, default=500_000)
|
|
|
|
if context["invoice_amount"] < MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT:
|
|
context["swap_allowed"] = False
|
|
context[
|
|
"swap_failure_reason"
|
|
] = f"Order amount is smaller than the minimum swap available of {MIN_SWAP_AMOUNT} Sats"
|
|
return True, context
|
|
elif context["invoice_amount"] > MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT:
|
|
context["swap_allowed"] = False
|
|
context[
|
|
"swap_failure_reason"
|
|
] = f"Order amount is bigger than the maximum swap available of {MAX_SWAP_AMOUNT} Sats"
|
|
return True, context
|
|
|
|
if config("DISABLE_ONCHAIN", cast=bool, default=True):
|
|
context["swap_allowed"] = False
|
|
context["swap_failure_reason"] = "On-the-fly submarine swaps are dissabled"
|
|
return True, context
|
|
|
|
if order.payout_tx is None:
|
|
# Creates the OnchainPayment object and checks node balance
|
|
valid = cls.create_onchain_payment(
|
|
order, user, preliminary_amount=context["invoice_amount"]
|
|
)
|
|
if not valid:
|
|
context["swap_allowed"] = False
|
|
context[
|
|
"swap_failure_reason"
|
|
] = "Not enough onchain liquidity available to offer a swap"
|
|
return True, context
|
|
|
|
context["swap_allowed"] = True
|
|
context["suggested_mining_fee_rate"] = order.payout_tx.suggested_mining_fee_rate
|
|
context["swap_fee_rate"] = order.payout_tx.swap_fee_rate
|
|
|
|
return True, context
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def escrow_amount(cls, order, user):
|
|
"""Computes escrow invoice amount. Uses order.last_satoshis,
|
|
that is the final trade amount set at Taker Bond time"""
|
|
|
|
if user == order.maker:
|
|
fee_fraction = FEE * MAKER_FEE_SPLIT
|
|
elif user == order.taker:
|
|
fee_fraction = FEE * (1 - MAKER_FEE_SPLIT)
|
|
|
|
fee_sats = order.last_satoshis * fee_fraction
|
|
|
|
if cls.is_seller(order, user):
|
|
escrow_amount = round(
|
|
order.last_satoshis + fee_sats
|
|
) # Trading fee to seller is charged here.
|
|
|
|
return True, {"escrow_amount": escrow_amount}
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def update_address(cls, order, user, address, mining_fee_rate):
|
|
|
|
# Empty address?
|
|
if not address:
|
|
return False, {"bad_address": "You submitted an empty invoice"}
|
|
# only the buyer can post a buyer address
|
|
if not cls.is_buyer(order, user):
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "Only the buyer of this order can provide a payout address."
|
|
}
|
|
# not the right time to submit
|
|
if not (
|
|
order.taker_bond.status
|
|
== order.maker_bond.status
|
|
== LNPayment.Status.LOCKED
|
|
) or order.status not in [Order.Status.WFI, Order.Status.WF2]:
|
|
return False, {"bad_request": "You cannot submit an address now."}
|
|
# not a valid address
|
|
valid, context = validate_onchain_address(address)
|
|
if not valid:
|
|
return False, context
|
|
|
|
num_satoshis = cls.payout_amount(order, user)[1]["invoice_amount"]
|
|
if mining_fee_rate:
|
|
# not a valid mining fee
|
|
min_mining_fee_rate = LNNode.estimate_fee(
|
|
amount_sats=num_satoshis,
|
|
target_conf=config("MINIMUM_TARGET_CONF", cast=int, default=24),
|
|
)["mining_fee_rate"]
|
|
|
|
min_mining_fee_rate = max(2, min_mining_fee_rate)
|
|
|
|
if float(mining_fee_rate) < min_mining_fee_rate:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_address": f"The mining fee is too low. Must be higher than {min_mining_fee_rate} Sat/vbyte"
|
|
}
|
|
elif float(mining_fee_rate) > 500:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_address": "The mining fee is too high, must be less than 500 Sats/vbyte"
|
|
}
|
|
order.payout_tx.mining_fee_rate = float(mining_fee_rate)
|
|
# If not mining fee provider use backend's suggested fee rate
|
|
else:
|
|
order.payout_tx.mining_fee_rate = order.payout_tx.suggested_mining_fee_rate
|
|
|
|
tx = order.payout_tx
|
|
tx.address = address
|
|
tx.mining_fee_sats = int(tx.mining_fee_rate * 280)
|
|
tx.num_satoshis = num_satoshis
|
|
tx.sent_satoshis = int(
|
|
float(tx.num_satoshis)
|
|
- float(tx.num_satoshis) * float(tx.swap_fee_rate) / 100
|
|
- float(tx.mining_fee_sats)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if float(tx.sent_satoshis) < 20_000:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_address": "The amount remaining after subtracting mining fee is close to dust limit."
|
|
}
|
|
tx.status = OnchainPayment.Status.VALID
|
|
tx.save()
|
|
|
|
order.is_swap = True
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["is_swap"])
|
|
|
|
cls.move_state_updated_payout_method(order)
|
|
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def update_invoice(cls, order, user, invoice, routing_budget_ppm):
|
|
|
|
# Empty invoice?
|
|
if not invoice:
|
|
return False, {"bad_invoice": "You submitted an empty invoice"}
|
|
# only the buyer can post a buyer invoice
|
|
if not cls.is_buyer(order, user):
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "Only the buyer of this order can provide a buyer invoice."
|
|
}
|
|
if not order.taker_bond:
|
|
return False, {"bad_request": "Wait for your order to be taken."}
|
|
if (
|
|
not (
|
|
order.taker_bond.status
|
|
== order.maker_bond.status
|
|
== LNPayment.Status.LOCKED
|
|
)
|
|
and not order.status == Order.Status.FAI
|
|
):
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "You cannot submit a invoice while bonds are not locked."
|
|
}
|
|
if order.status == Order.Status.FAI:
|
|
if order.payout.status != LNPayment.Status.EXPIRE:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "You cannot submit an invoice only after expiration or 3 failed attempts"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# cancel onchain_payout if existing
|
|
cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order)
|
|
|
|
num_satoshis = cls.payout_amount(order, user)[1]["invoice_amount"]
|
|
routing_budget_sats = float(num_satoshis) * (
|
|
float(routing_budget_ppm) / 1_000_000
|
|
)
|
|
num_satoshis = int(num_satoshis - routing_budget_sats)
|
|
payout = LNNode.validate_ln_invoice(invoice, num_satoshis, routing_budget_ppm)
|
|
|
|
if not payout["valid"]:
|
|
return False, payout["context"]
|
|
|
|
order.payout, _ = LNPayment.objects.update_or_create(
|
|
concept=LNPayment.Concepts.PAYBUYER,
|
|
type=LNPayment.Types.NORM,
|
|
sender=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
|
|
# In case this user has other payouts, update the one related to this order.
|
|
order_paid_LN=order,
|
|
receiver=user,
|
|
routing_budget_ppm=routing_budget_ppm,
|
|
routing_budget_sats=routing_budget_sats,
|
|
# if there is a LNPayment matching these above, it updates that one with defaults below.
|
|
defaults={
|
|
"invoice": invoice,
|
|
"status": LNPayment.Status.VALIDI,
|
|
"num_satoshis": num_satoshis,
|
|
"description": payout["description"],
|
|
"payment_hash": payout["payment_hash"],
|
|
"created_at": payout["created_at"],
|
|
"expires_at": payout["expires_at"],
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
order.is_swap = False
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["payout", "is_swap"])
|
|
|
|
cls.move_state_updated_payout_method(order)
|
|
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def move_state_updated_payout_method(cls, order):
|
|
# If the order status is 'Waiting for invoice'. Move forward to 'chat'
|
|
if order.status == Order.Status.WFI:
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.CHA
|
|
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
|
|
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA)
|
|
)
|
|
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="fiat_exchange_starts")
|
|
|
|
# If the order status is 'Waiting for both'. Move forward to 'waiting for escrow'
|
|
elif order.status == Order.Status.WF2:
|
|
# If the escrow does not exist, or is not locked move to WFE.
|
|
if order.trade_escrow is None:
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.WFE
|
|
# If the escrow is locked move to Chat.
|
|
elif order.trade_escrow.status == LNPayment.Status.LOCKED:
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.CHA
|
|
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
|
|
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA)
|
|
)
|
|
send_notification.delay(
|
|
order_id=order.id, message="fiat_exchange_starts"
|
|
)
|
|
else:
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.WFE
|
|
|
|
# If the order status is 'Failed Routing'. Retry payment.
|
|
elif order.status == Order.Status.FAI:
|
|
if LNNode.double_check_htlc_is_settled(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.PAY
|
|
order.payout.status = LNPayment.Status.FLIGHT
|
|
order.payout.routing_attempts = 0
|
|
order.payout.save(update_fields=["status", "routing_attempts"])
|
|
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status", "expires_at"])
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
def is_penalized(user):
|
|
"""Checks if a user that is not participant of orders
|
|
has a limit on taking or making a order"""
|
|
|
|
if user.robot.penalty_expiration:
|
|
if user.robot.penalty_expiration > timezone.now():
|
|
time_out = (user.robot.penalty_expiration - timezone.now()).seconds
|
|
return True, time_out
|
|
|
|
return False, None
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def cancel_order(cls, order, user, state=None):
|
|
|
|
# Do not change order status if an is in order
|
|
# any of these status
|
|
do_not_cancel = [
|
|
Order.Status.UCA,
|
|
Order.Status.EXP,
|
|
Order.Status.TLD,
|
|
Order.Status.DIS,
|
|
Order.Status.CCA,
|
|
Order.Status.PAY,
|
|
Order.Status.SUC,
|
|
Order.Status.FAI,
|
|
Order.Status.MLD,
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
if order.status in do_not_cancel:
|
|
return False, {"bad_request": "You cannot cancel this order"}
|
|
|
|
# 1) When maker cancels before bond
|
|
# The order never shows up on the book and order
|
|
# status becomes "cancelled"
|
|
if order.status == Order.Status.WFB and order.maker == user:
|
|
cls.cancel_bond(order.maker_bond)
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.UCA
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
# 2.a) When maker cancels after bond
|
|
#
|
|
# The order dissapears from book and goes to cancelled. If strict, maker is charged the bond
|
|
# to prevent DDOS on the LN node and order book. If not strict, maker is returned
|
|
# the bond (more user friendly).
|
|
elif (
|
|
order.status in [Order.Status.PUB, Order.Status.PAU] and order.maker == user
|
|
):
|
|
# Return the maker bond (Maker gets returned the bond for cancelling public order)
|
|
if cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond):
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.UCA
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
send_notification.delay(
|
|
order_id=order.id, message="public_order_cancelled"
|
|
)
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
# 2.b) When maker cancels after bond and before taker bond is locked
|
|
#
|
|
# The order dissapears from book and goes to cancelled.
|
|
# The bond maker bond is returned.
|
|
elif order.status == Order.Status.TAK and order.maker == user:
|
|
# Return the maker bond (Maker gets returned the bond for cancelling public order)
|
|
if cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond):
|
|
cls.cancel_bond(order.taker_bond)
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.UCA
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
send_notification.delay(
|
|
order_id=order.id, message="public_order_cancelled"
|
|
)
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
# 3) When taker cancels before bond
|
|
# The order goes back to the book as public.
|
|
# LNPayment "order.taker_bond" is deleted()
|
|
elif order.status == Order.Status.TAK and order.taker == user:
|
|
# adds a timeout penalty
|
|
cls.cancel_bond(order.taker_bond)
|
|
cls.kick_taker(order)
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
# 4) When taker or maker cancel after bond (before escrow)
|
|
#
|
|
# The order goes into cancelled status if maker cancels.
|
|
# The order goes into the public book if taker cancels.
|
|
# In both cases there is a small fee.
|
|
|
|
# 4.a) When maker cancel after bond (before escrow)
|
|
# The order into cancelled status if maker cancels.
|
|
elif (
|
|
order.status in [Order.Status.WF2, Order.Status.WFE] and order.maker == user
|
|
):
|
|
# cancel onchain payment if existing
|
|
cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order)
|
|
# Settle the maker bond (Maker loses the bond for canceling an ongoing trade)
|
|
valid = cls.settle_bond(order.maker_bond)
|
|
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond) # returns taker bond
|
|
|
|
if valid:
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.UCA
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
# Reward taker with part of the maker bond
|
|
cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, order.maker_bond, order.taker_bond)
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
# 4.b) When taker cancel after bond (before escrow)
|
|
# The order into cancelled status if mtker cancels.
|
|
elif (
|
|
order.status in [Order.Status.WF2, Order.Status.WFE] and order.taker == user
|
|
):
|
|
# cancel onchain payment if existing
|
|
cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order)
|
|
# Settle the maker bond (Maker loses the bond for canceling an ongoing trade)
|
|
valid = cls.settle_bond(order.taker_bond)
|
|
if valid:
|
|
taker_bond = order.taker_bond
|
|
cls.publish_order(order)
|
|
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_published")
|
|
# Reward maker with part of the taker bond
|
|
cls.add_slashed_rewards(order, taker_bond, order.maker_bond)
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
# 5) When trade collateral has been posted (after escrow)
|
|
#
|
|
# Always goes to CCA status. Collaboration is needed.
|
|
# When a user asks for cancel, 'order.m/t/aker_asked_cancel' goes True.
|
|
# When the second user asks for cancel. Order is totally cancelled.
|
|
# Must have a small cost for both parties to prevent node DDOS.
|
|
elif order.status in [Order.Status.WFI, Order.Status.CHA]:
|
|
|
|
# if the maker had asked, and now the taker does: cancel order, return everything
|
|
if order.maker_asked_cancel and user == order.taker:
|
|
cls.collaborative_cancel(order)
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
# if the taker had asked, and now the maker does: cancel order, return everything
|
|
elif order.taker_asked_cancel and user == order.maker:
|
|
cls.collaborative_cancel(order)
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
# Otherwise just make true the asked for cancel flags
|
|
elif user == order.taker:
|
|
order.taker_asked_cancel = True
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["taker_asked_cancel"])
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
elif user == order.maker:
|
|
order.maker_asked_cancel = True
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["maker_asked_cancel"])
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
return False, {"bad_request": "You cannot cancel this order"}
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def collaborative_cancel(cls, order):
|
|
if order.status not in [Order.Status.WFI, Order.Status.CHA]:
|
|
return
|
|
# cancel onchain payment if existing
|
|
cls.cancel_onchain_payment(order)
|
|
cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond)
|
|
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
|
|
cls.return_escrow(order)
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.CCA
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="collaborative_cancelled")
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def publish_order(cls, order):
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.PUB
|
|
order.expires_at = order.created_at + timedelta(
|
|
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.PUB)
|
|
)
|
|
if order.has_range:
|
|
order.amount = None
|
|
order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order)
|
|
order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now()
|
|
|
|
# clear fields in case of re-publishing after expiry
|
|
order.taker = None
|
|
order.taker_bond = None
|
|
order.trade_escrow = None
|
|
order.payout = None
|
|
order.payout_tx = None
|
|
|
|
order.save() # update all fields
|
|
|
|
# send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id,'order_published') # too spammy
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
def compute_cltv_expiry_blocks(order, invoice_concept):
|
|
"""Computes timelock CLTV expiry of the last hop in blocks for hodl invoices
|
|
|
|
invoice_concepts (str): maker_bond, taker_bond, trade_escrow
|
|
"""
|
|
# Every invoice_concept must be locked by at least the fiat exchange duration
|
|
# Every invoice must also be locked for deposit_time (order.escrow_duration or WFE status)
|
|
cltv_expiry_secs = order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA)
|
|
cltv_expiry_secs += order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WFE)
|
|
|
|
# Maker bond must also be locked for the full public duration plus the taker bond locking time
|
|
if invoice_concept == "maker_bond":
|
|
cltv_expiry_secs += order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.PUB)
|
|
cltv_expiry_secs += order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK)
|
|
|
|
# Add a safety marging by multiplying by the maxium expected mining network speed up
|
|
safe_cltv_expiry_secs = cltv_expiry_secs * MAX_MINING_NETWORK_SPEEDUP_EXPECTED
|
|
# Convert to blocks using assummed average block time (~8 mins/block)
|
|
cltv_expiry_blocks = int(safe_cltv_expiry_secs / (BLOCK_TIME * 60))
|
|
|
|
return cltv_expiry_blocks
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def gen_maker_hold_invoice(cls, order, user):
|
|
# Do not gen and cancel if order is older than expiry time
|
|
if order.expires_at < timezone.now():
|
|
cls.order_expires(order)
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "Invoice expired. You did not confirm publishing the order in time. Make a new order."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Return the previous invoice if there was one and is still unpaid
|
|
if order.maker_bond:
|
|
return True, {
|
|
"bond_invoice": order.maker_bond.invoice,
|
|
"bond_satoshis": order.maker_bond.num_satoshis,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# If there was no maker_bond object yet, generates one
|
|
order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order)
|
|
order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now()
|
|
bond_satoshis = int(order.last_satoshis * order.bond_size / 100)
|
|
|
|
if user.robot.wants_stealth:
|
|
description = f"This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally. Payment reference: {order.reference}"
|
|
else:
|
|
description = f"RoboSats - Publishing '{str(order)}' - Maker bond - This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally."
|
|
|
|
# Gen hold Invoice
|
|
try:
|
|
hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice(
|
|
bond_satoshis,
|
|
description,
|
|
invoice_expiry=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WFB),
|
|
cltv_expiry_blocks=cls.compute_cltv_expiry_blocks(order, "maker_bond"),
|
|
order_id=order.id,
|
|
lnpayment_concept=LNPayment.Concepts.MAKEBOND.label,
|
|
time=int(timezone.now().timestamp()),
|
|
)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
print(str(e))
|
|
if "failed to connect to all addresses" in str(e):
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware."
|
|
}
|
|
elif "wallet locked" in str(e):
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "This is weird, RoboSats' lightning wallet is locked. Check in the Telegram group, maybe the staff has died."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
order.maker_bond = LNPayment.objects.create(
|
|
concept=LNPayment.Concepts.MAKEBOND,
|
|
type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD,
|
|
sender=user,
|
|
receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
|
|
invoice=hold_payment["invoice"],
|
|
preimage=hold_payment["preimage"],
|
|
status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN,
|
|
num_satoshis=bond_satoshis,
|
|
description=description,
|
|
payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"],
|
|
created_at=hold_payment["created_at"],
|
|
expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"],
|
|
cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"],
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["last_satoshis", "last_satoshis_time", "maker_bond"])
|
|
return True, {
|
|
"bond_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"],
|
|
"bond_satoshis": bond_satoshis,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def finalize_contract(cls, order):
|
|
"""When the taker locks the taker_bond
|
|
the contract is final"""
|
|
|
|
# THE TRADE AMOUNT IS FINAL WITH THE CONFIRMATION OF THE TAKER BOND!
|
|
# (This is the last update to "last_satoshis", it becomes the escrow amount next)
|
|
order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order)
|
|
order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now()
|
|
order.taker_bond.status = LNPayment.Status.LOCKED
|
|
order.taker_bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
|
|
# With the bond confirmation the order is extended 'public_order_duration' hours
|
|
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
|
|
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WF2)
|
|
)
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.WF2
|
|
order.save(
|
|
update_fields=[
|
|
"last_satoshis",
|
|
"last_satoshis_time",
|
|
"expires_at",
|
|
"status",
|
|
]
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Both users robots are added one more contract // Unsafe can add more than once.
|
|
order.maker.robot.total_contracts += 1
|
|
order.taker.robot.total_contracts += 1
|
|
order.maker.robot.save(update_fields=["total_contracts"])
|
|
order.taker.robot.save(update_fields=["total_contracts"])
|
|
|
|
# Log a market tick
|
|
try:
|
|
MarketTick.log_a_tick(order)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
pass
|
|
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="order_taken_confirmed")
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def gen_taker_hold_invoice(cls, order, user):
|
|
|
|
# Do not gen and kick out the taker if order is older than expiry time
|
|
if order.expires_at < timezone.now():
|
|
cls.order_expires(order)
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "Invoice expired. You did not confirm taking the order in time."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Do not gen if a taker invoice exist. Do not return if it is already locked. Return the old one if still waiting.
|
|
if order.taker_bond:
|
|
return True, {
|
|
"bond_invoice": order.taker_bond.invoice,
|
|
"bond_satoshis": order.taker_bond.num_satoshis,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# If there was no taker_bond object yet, generates one
|
|
order.last_satoshis = cls.satoshis_now(order)
|
|
order.last_satoshis_time = timezone.now()
|
|
bond_satoshis = int(order.last_satoshis * order.bond_size / 100)
|
|
pos_text = "Buying" if cls.is_buyer(order, user) else "Selling"
|
|
if user.robot.wants_stealth:
|
|
description = f"This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally. Payment reference: {order.reference}"
|
|
else:
|
|
description = (
|
|
f"RoboSats - Taking 'Order {order.id}' {pos_text} BTC for {str(float(order.amount)) + Currency.currency_dict[str(order.currency.currency)]}"
|
|
+ " - Taker bond - This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally."
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Gen hold Invoice
|
|
try:
|
|
hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice(
|
|
bond_satoshis,
|
|
description,
|
|
invoice_expiry=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK),
|
|
cltv_expiry_blocks=cls.compute_cltv_expiry_blocks(order, "taker_bond"),
|
|
order_id=order.id,
|
|
lnpayment_concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TAKEBOND.label,
|
|
time=int(timezone.now().timestamp()),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
if "status = StatusCode.UNAVAILABLE" in str(e):
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
order.taker_bond = LNPayment.objects.create(
|
|
concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TAKEBOND,
|
|
type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD,
|
|
sender=user,
|
|
receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
|
|
invoice=hold_payment["invoice"],
|
|
preimage=hold_payment["preimage"],
|
|
status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN,
|
|
num_satoshis=bond_satoshis,
|
|
description=description,
|
|
payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"],
|
|
created_at=hold_payment["created_at"],
|
|
expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"],
|
|
cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"],
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
|
|
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.TAK)
|
|
)
|
|
order.save(
|
|
update_fields=[
|
|
"expires_at",
|
|
"last_satoshis_time",
|
|
"taker_bond",
|
|
"expires_at",
|
|
]
|
|
)
|
|
return True, {
|
|
"bond_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"],
|
|
"bond_satoshis": bond_satoshis,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
def trade_escrow_received(order):
|
|
"""Moves the order forward"""
|
|
# If status is 'Waiting for both' move to Waiting for invoice
|
|
if order.status == Order.Status.WF2:
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.WFI
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
# If status is 'Waiting for invoice' move to Chat
|
|
elif order.status == Order.Status.WFE:
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.CHA
|
|
order.expires_at = timezone.now() + timedelta(
|
|
seconds=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.CHA)
|
|
)
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status", "expires_at"])
|
|
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="fiat_exchange_starts")
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def gen_escrow_hold_invoice(cls, order, user):
|
|
|
|
# Do not generate if escrow deposit time has expired
|
|
if order.expires_at < timezone.now():
|
|
cls.order_expires(order)
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "Invoice expired. You did not send the escrow in time."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Do not gen if an escrow invoice exist. Do not return if it is already locked. Return the old one if still waiting.
|
|
if order.trade_escrow:
|
|
return True, {
|
|
"escrow_invoice": order.trade_escrow.invoice,
|
|
"escrow_satoshis": order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# If there was no taker_bond object yet, generate one
|
|
escrow_satoshis = cls.escrow_amount(order, user)[1][
|
|
"escrow_amount"
|
|
] # Amount was fixed when taker bond was locked, fee applied here
|
|
if user.robot.wants_stealth:
|
|
description = f"This payment WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET, check on the website if it was successful. It will automatically return unless you cheat or cancel unilaterally. Payment reference: {order.reference}"
|
|
else:
|
|
description = f"RoboSats - Escrow amount for '{str(order)}' - It WILL FREEZE IN YOUR WALLET. It will be released to the buyer once you confirm you received the fiat. It will automatically return if buyer does not confirm the payment."
|
|
|
|
# Gen hold Invoice
|
|
try:
|
|
hold_payment = LNNode.gen_hold_invoice(
|
|
escrow_satoshis,
|
|
description,
|
|
invoice_expiry=order.t_to_expire(Order.Status.WF2),
|
|
cltv_expiry_blocks=cls.compute_cltv_expiry_blocks(
|
|
order, "trade_escrow"
|
|
),
|
|
order_id=order.id,
|
|
lnpayment_concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TRESCROW.label,
|
|
time=int(timezone.now().timestamp()),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
if "status = StatusCode.UNAVAILABLE" in str(e):
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "The Lightning Network Daemon (LND) is down. Write in the Telegram group to make sure the staff is aware."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
order.trade_escrow = LNPayment.objects.create(
|
|
concept=LNPayment.Concepts.TRESCROW,
|
|
type=LNPayment.Types.HOLD,
|
|
sender=user,
|
|
receiver=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
|
|
invoice=hold_payment["invoice"],
|
|
preimage=hold_payment["preimage"],
|
|
status=LNPayment.Status.INVGEN,
|
|
num_satoshis=escrow_satoshis,
|
|
description=description,
|
|
payment_hash=hold_payment["payment_hash"],
|
|
created_at=hold_payment["created_at"],
|
|
expires_at=hold_payment["expires_at"],
|
|
cltv_expiry=hold_payment["cltv_expiry"],
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["trade_escrow"])
|
|
return True, {
|
|
"escrow_invoice": hold_payment["invoice"],
|
|
"escrow_satoshis": escrow_satoshis,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
def settle_escrow(order):
|
|
"""Settles the trade escrow hold invoice"""
|
|
if LNNode.settle_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.preimage):
|
|
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
|
|
order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
def settle_bond(bond):
|
|
"""Settles the bond hold invoice"""
|
|
if LNNode.settle_hold_invoice(bond.preimage):
|
|
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
|
|
bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
def return_escrow(order):
|
|
"""returns the trade escrow"""
|
|
if LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
|
|
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.RETNED
|
|
order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
def cancel_escrow(order):
|
|
"""returns the trade escrow"""
|
|
# Same as return escrow, but used when the invoice was never LOCKED
|
|
if LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
|
|
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.CANCEL
|
|
order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
def return_bond(bond):
|
|
"""returns a bond"""
|
|
if bond is None:
|
|
return
|
|
try:
|
|
LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(bond.payment_hash)
|
|
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.RETNED
|
|
bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
return True
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
if "invoice already settled" in str(e):
|
|
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
|
|
bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
return True
|
|
else:
|
|
raise e
|
|
|
|
def cancel_onchain_payment(order):
|
|
"""Cancel onchain_payment if existing"""
|
|
|
|
if order.payout_tx:
|
|
order.payout_tx.status = OnchainPayment.Status.CANCE
|
|
order.payout_tx.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
return True
|
|
else:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
def cancel_bond(bond):
|
|
"""cancel a bond"""
|
|
# Same as return bond, but used when the invoice was never LOCKED
|
|
if bond is None:
|
|
return True
|
|
try:
|
|
LNNode.cancel_return_hold_invoice(bond.payment_hash)
|
|
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.CANCEL
|
|
bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
return True
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
if "invoice already settled" in str(e):
|
|
bond.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
|
|
bond.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
return True
|
|
else:
|
|
raise e
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def pay_buyer(cls, order):
|
|
"""Pays buyer invoice or onchain address"""
|
|
|
|
# Pay to buyer invoice
|
|
if not order.is_swap:
|
|
# Background process "follow_invoices" will try to pay this invoice until success
|
|
order.payout.status = LNPayment.Status.FLIGHT
|
|
order.payout.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.PAY
|
|
order.contract_finalization_time = timezone.now()
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status", "contract_finalization_time"])
|
|
|
|
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="trade_successful")
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
# Pay onchain to address
|
|
else:
|
|
if not order.payout_tx.status == OnchainPayment.Status.VALID:
|
|
return False
|
|
else:
|
|
# Add onchain payment to queue
|
|
order.payout_tx.status = OnchainPayment.Status.QUEUE
|
|
order.payout_tx.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.SUC
|
|
order.contract_finalization_time = timezone.now()
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status", "contract_finalization_time"])
|
|
|
|
send_notification.delay(order_id=order.id, message="trade_successful")
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def confirm_fiat(cls, order, user):
|
|
"""If Order is in the CHAT states:
|
|
If user is buyer: fiat_sent goes to true.
|
|
If User is seller and fiat_sent is true: settle the escrow and pay buyer invoice!"""
|
|
|
|
if order.status == Order.Status.CHA or order.status == Order.Status.FSE:
|
|
|
|
# If buyer, settle escrow and mark fiat sent
|
|
if cls.is_buyer(order, user):
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.FSE
|
|
order.is_fiat_sent = True
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status", "is_fiat_sent"])
|
|
|
|
# If seller and fiat was sent, SETTLE ESCROW AND PAY BUYER INVOICE
|
|
elif cls.is_seller(order, user):
|
|
if not order.is_fiat_sent:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "You cannot confirm to have received the fiat before it is confirmed to be sent by the buyer."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Make sure the trade escrow is at least as big as the buyer invoice
|
|
num_satoshis = (
|
|
order.payout_tx.num_satoshis
|
|
if order.is_swap
|
|
else order.payout.num_satoshis
|
|
)
|
|
if order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis <= num_satoshis:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "Woah, something broke badly. Report in the public channels, or open a Github Issue."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# !!! KEY LINE - SETTLES THE TRADE ESCROW !!!
|
|
if cls.settle_escrow(order):
|
|
order.trade_escrow.status = LNPayment.Status.SETLED
|
|
order.trade_escrow.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
|
|
# Double check the escrow is settled.
|
|
if LNNode.double_check_htlc_is_settled(order.trade_escrow.payment_hash):
|
|
# RETURN THE BONDS
|
|
cls.return_bond(order.taker_bond)
|
|
cls.return_bond(order.maker_bond)
|
|
# !!! KEY LINE - PAYS THE BUYER INVOICE !!!
|
|
cls.pay_buyer(order)
|
|
|
|
# Computes coordinator trade revenue
|
|
cls.compute_proceeds(order)
|
|
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "You cannot confirm the fiat payment at this stage"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def undo_confirm_fiat_sent(cls, order, user):
|
|
"""If Order is in the CHAT states:
|
|
If user is buyer: fiat_sent goes to true.
|
|
"""
|
|
if not cls.is_buyer(order, user):
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "Only the buyer can undo the fiat sent confirmation."
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if order.status != Order.Status.FSE:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "Only orders in Chat and with fiat sent confirmed can be reverted."
|
|
}
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.CHA
|
|
order.is_fiat_sent = False
|
|
order.reverted_fiat_sent = True
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status", "is_fiat_sent", "reverted_fiat_sent"])
|
|
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
def pause_unpause_public_order(order, user):
|
|
if not order.maker == user:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "You cannot pause or unpause an order you did not make"
|
|
}
|
|
else:
|
|
if order.status == Order.Status.PUB:
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.PAU
|
|
elif order.status == Order.Status.PAU:
|
|
order.status = Order.Status.PUB
|
|
else:
|
|
return False, {
|
|
"bad_request": "You can only pause/unpause an order that is either public or paused"
|
|
}
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["status"])
|
|
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def rate_platform(cls, user, rating):
|
|
user.robot.platform_rating = rating
|
|
user.robot.save(update_fields=["platform_rating"])
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def add_slashed_rewards(cls, order, slashed_bond, staked_bond):
|
|
"""
|
|
When a bond is slashed due to overtime, rewards the user that was waiting.
|
|
|
|
slashed_bond is the bond settled by the robot who forfeits his bond.
|
|
staked_bond is the bond that was at stake by the robot who is rewarded.
|
|
|
|
It may happen that the Sats at stake by the maker are larger than the Sats
|
|
at stake by the taker (range amount orders where the taker does not take the
|
|
maximum available). In those cases, the change is added back also to the robot
|
|
that was slashed (discounted by the forfeited amount).
|
|
"""
|
|
reward_fraction = config("SLASHED_BOND_REWARD_SPLIT", cast=float, default=0.5)
|
|
|
|
if staked_bond.num_satoshis < slashed_bond.num_satoshis:
|
|
slashed_satoshis = min(slashed_bond.num_satoshis, staked_bond.num_satoshis)
|
|
slashed_return = int(slashed_bond.num_satoshis - slashed_satoshis)
|
|
else:
|
|
slashed_satoshis = slashed_bond.num_satoshis
|
|
slashed_return = 0
|
|
|
|
reward = int(slashed_satoshis * reward_fraction)
|
|
rewarded_robot = staked_bond.sender.robot
|
|
rewarded_robot.earned_rewards += reward
|
|
rewarded_robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"])
|
|
|
|
if slashed_return > 100:
|
|
slashed_robot = slashed_bond.sender.robot
|
|
slashed_robot.earned_rewards += slashed_return
|
|
slashed_robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"])
|
|
|
|
new_proceeds = int(slashed_satoshis * (1 - reward_fraction))
|
|
order.proceeds += new_proceeds
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["proceeds"])
|
|
send_devfund_donation.delay(order.id, new_proceeds, "slashed bond")
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def withdraw_rewards(cls, user, invoice):
|
|
|
|
# only a user with positive withdraw balance can use this
|
|
|
|
if user.robot.earned_rewards < 1:
|
|
return False, {"bad_invoice": "You have not earned rewards"}
|
|
|
|
num_satoshis = user.robot.earned_rewards
|
|
|
|
routing_budget_sats = int(
|
|
max(
|
|
num_satoshis * float(config("PROPORTIONAL_ROUTING_FEE_LIMIT")),
|
|
float(config("MIN_FLAT_ROUTING_FEE_LIMIT_REWARD")),
|
|
)
|
|
) # 1000 ppm or 10 sats
|
|
|
|
routing_budget_ppm = (routing_budget_sats / float(num_satoshis)) * 1_000_000
|
|
reward_payout = LNNode.validate_ln_invoice(
|
|
invoice, num_satoshis, routing_budget_ppm
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
if not reward_payout["valid"]:
|
|
return False, reward_payout["context"]
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
lnpayment = LNPayment.objects.create(
|
|
concept=LNPayment.Concepts.WITHREWA,
|
|
type=LNPayment.Types.NORM,
|
|
sender=User.objects.get(username=ESCROW_USERNAME),
|
|
status=LNPayment.Status.VALIDI,
|
|
receiver=user,
|
|
invoice=invoice,
|
|
num_satoshis=num_satoshis,
|
|
description=reward_payout["description"],
|
|
payment_hash=reward_payout["payment_hash"],
|
|
created_at=reward_payout["created_at"],
|
|
expires_at=reward_payout["expires_at"],
|
|
)
|
|
# Might fail if payment_hash already exists in DB
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return False, {"bad_invoice": "Give me a new invoice"}
|
|
|
|
user.robot.earned_rewards = 0
|
|
user.robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"])
|
|
|
|
# Pays the invoice.
|
|
paid, failure_reason = LNNode.pay_invoice(lnpayment)
|
|
if paid:
|
|
user.robot.earned_rewards = 0
|
|
user.robot.claimed_rewards += num_satoshis
|
|
user.robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards", "claimed_rewards"])
|
|
return True, None
|
|
|
|
# If fails, adds the rewards again.
|
|
else:
|
|
user.robot.earned_rewards = num_satoshis
|
|
user.robot.save(update_fields=["earned_rewards"])
|
|
context = {}
|
|
context["bad_invoice"] = failure_reason
|
|
return False, context
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def compute_proceeds(cls, order):
|
|
"""
|
|
Computes Coordinator trade proceeds for finished orders.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
if order.is_swap:
|
|
payout_sats = (
|
|
order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis + order.payout_tx.mining_fee_sats
|
|
)
|
|
new_proceeds = int(order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - payout_sats)
|
|
else:
|
|
payout_sats = order.payout.num_satoshis + order.payout.fee
|
|
new_proceeds = int(order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - payout_sats)
|
|
|
|
order.proceeds += new_proceeds
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["proceeds"])
|
|
send_devfund_donation.delay(order.id, new_proceeds, "successful order")
|
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def summarize_trade(cls, order, user):
|
|
"""
|
|
Summarizes a finished order. Returns a dict with
|
|
amounts, fees, costs, etc, for buyer and seller.
|
|
"""
|
|
if order.status not in [Order.Status.SUC, Order.Status.PAY, Order.Status.FAI]:
|
|
return False, {"bad_summary": "Order has not finished yet"}
|
|
|
|
context = {}
|
|
|
|
users = {"taker": order.taker, "maker": order.maker}
|
|
for order_user in users:
|
|
|
|
summary = {}
|
|
summary["trade_fee_percent"] = (
|
|
FEE * MAKER_FEE_SPLIT
|
|
if order_user == "maker"
|
|
else FEE * (1 - MAKER_FEE_SPLIT)
|
|
)
|
|
summary["bond_size_sats"] = (
|
|
order.maker_bond.num_satoshis
|
|
if order_user == "maker"
|
|
else order.taker_bond.num_satoshis
|
|
)
|
|
summary["bond_size_percent"] = order.bond_size
|
|
summary["is_buyer"] = cls.is_buyer(order, users[order_user])
|
|
|
|
if summary["is_buyer"]:
|
|
summary["sent_fiat"] = order.amount
|
|
if order.is_swap:
|
|
summary["received_sats"] = order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis
|
|
else:
|
|
summary["received_sats"] = order.payout.num_satoshis
|
|
summary["payment_hash"] = order.payout.payment_hash
|
|
summary["preimage"] = order.payout.preimage
|
|
summary["trade_fee_sats"] = round(
|
|
order.last_satoshis
|
|
- summary["received_sats"]
|
|
- (order.payout.routing_budget_sats if not order.is_swap else 0)
|
|
)
|
|
# Only add context for swap costs if the user is the swap recipient. Peer should not know whether it was a swap
|
|
if users[order_user] == user and order.is_swap:
|
|
summary["is_swap"] = order.is_swap
|
|
summary["received_onchain_sats"] = order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis
|
|
summary["address"] = order.payout_tx.address
|
|
summary["txid"] = order.payout_tx.txid
|
|
summary["mining_fee_sats"] = order.payout_tx.mining_fee_sats
|
|
summary["swap_fee_sats"] = round(
|
|
order.payout_tx.num_satoshis
|
|
- order.payout_tx.mining_fee_sats
|
|
- order.payout_tx.sent_satoshis
|
|
)
|
|
summary["swap_fee_percent"] = order.payout_tx.swap_fee_rate
|
|
summary["trade_fee_sats"] = round(
|
|
order.last_satoshis
|
|
- summary["received_sats"]
|
|
- summary["mining_fee_sats"]
|
|
- summary["swap_fee_sats"]
|
|
)
|
|
else:
|
|
summary["sent_sats"] = order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis
|
|
summary["received_fiat"] = order.amount
|
|
summary["trade_fee_sats"] = round(
|
|
summary["sent_sats"] - order.last_satoshis
|
|
)
|
|
context[f"{order_user}_summary"] = summary
|
|
|
|
platform_summary = {}
|
|
platform_summary["contract_exchange_rate"] = float(order.amount) / (
|
|
float(order.last_satoshis) / 100_000_000
|
|
)
|
|
if order.last_satoshis_time is not None:
|
|
platform_summary["contract_timestamp"] = order.last_satoshis_time
|
|
if order.contract_finalization_time is None:
|
|
order.contract_finalization_time = timezone.now()
|
|
order.save(update_fields=["contract_finalization_time"])
|
|
platform_summary["contract_total_time"] = (
|
|
order.contract_finalization_time - order.last_satoshis_time
|
|
)
|
|
if not order.is_swap:
|
|
platform_summary["routing_budget_sats"] = order.payout.routing_budget_sats
|
|
platform_summary["trade_revenue_sats"] = int(
|
|
order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - order.payout.num_satoshis
|
|
)
|
|
else:
|
|
platform_summary["routing_fee_sats"] = 0
|
|
platform_summary["trade_revenue_sats"] = int(
|
|
order.trade_escrow.num_satoshis - order.payout_tx.num_satoshis
|
|
)
|
|
context["platform_summary"] = platform_summary
|
|
|
|
return True, context
|